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INTO THE WOODS: A BIOLOGIC 
PATENT THICKET ANALYSIS 
JEFFREY WU* 
CLAIRE WAN-CHIUNG CHENG** 
ABSTRACT 
Some drug companies, brand biologic companies, in particular, have 
been accused of covering only a single drug with more than eighty patents. 
These drug patents accumulate to what critics claim as one of the major 
culprits of high drug prices— “patent thickets.” 
This article aims to provide insight into this issue by analyzing the 
U.S. patents that cover top-selling biologics and small-molecule drugs. 
Results not only confirm the existence of biologic patent thickets—in which 
two of the three selected top-selling biologics have accumulated more than 
forty patents— but also show that more patents cover biologics than small-
molecule drugs. Based on more in-depth analysis, this article further 
argues that the so-called “patent thicket” is, in fact, a cooperative effort of 
two types of patent thickets—Type I and Type II—that should be 
distinguished due to their differences in nature and the causes that give rise 
to them. 
Defined as large numbers of non-overlapping or inventive patents that 
cover different aspects of the drug, Type I Patent Thickets are formed due 
to the complex nature of biologics and biosimilars. Type II Patent Thickets, 
on the other hand, are arguably overlapping or non-inventive patents that 
are prone to double patenting. They cover the same aspect of the drug and 
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owe their existence to the utilization of terminal disclaimers. The two types 
of patent thickets jointly contribute to the large number of patents that fend 
off patent challenges; the stretched year spans of collective patent terms 
that delay biosimilar entry; and the exorbitant drug prices that harm 
patients. 
This article also presents two proposals that may mitigate the negative 
impacts of patent thickets without completely sacrificing the merits patents 
themselves provide: one being the election of patents to assert, and the 
other being the more transformative “All-in-One” approach. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Biological products (or biologics) are medicinal products generally 
derived from living material for the prevention, treatment or cure of human 
disease.1 They are highly targeted, efficacious against diseases such as 
cancer, diabetes, rheumatoid arthritis, and other inflammatory conditions.2 
However, in contrast to chemical compound (or small-molecule) drugs, 
biologics encounter significantly more challenges than their counterparts 
due to their larger size and more complex nature.3 These challenges affect 
both on the difficulty to manufacture them and most importantly, on the 
exorbitant prices in the market.4 
As an effort to increase competition among biologics with the hopes 
of driving down the high prices of biologics, the U.S. Congress passed the 
Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009 (hereafter 
“BPCIA”)5 to provide an abbreviated approval pathway for biosimilars 
(also known as “follow-on biologics”).6 The purpose of the BPCIA is to 
balance innovation incentives with the promotion of competition and 
consumer interests by on one hand, allowing biosimilar manufactures to 
partially reference their clinical trial data to that of an approved biologic’s 
during the biosimilar approval examination process; and on the other hand, 
benefiting the innovator with twelve years of data exclusivity and 
providing an efficient patent dispute resolution process.7 Nevertheless, 
biologics are still costly in the U.S. with treatment expenses up to US$ 
25,000 annually per patient for some biologics.8 Critics argue that these 
 
1.  Frequently Asked Questions About Therapeutic Biological Products, U.S. FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2019). 
2.  Brian K. Chen et al., Why Biologics and Biosimilars Remain So Expensive: Despite Two Wins 
for Biosimilars, the Supreme Court’s Recent Rulings Do Not Solve Fundamental Barriers to 
Competition, 78 DRUGS 1777, 1777 (2018).  
3.  JOANNA T. BROUGHER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HEALTH TECHNOLOGIES: BALANCING 
INNOVATION AND THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH 161 (2014). 
4.  See id.; Tao Gu et al., Comparing Biologic Cost Per Treated Patient Across Indications 
Among Adult US Managed Care Patients: A Retrospective Cohort Study, 3 DRUGS - REAL WORLD 
OUTCOMES 369, 380 (2016). 
5.  Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 7001-7003, 
124 Stat. 119, 804-21 (2010) (codified and amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C., 35 U.S.C., 28 
U.S.C.). 
6.  Jon Tanaka, “Shall” We Dance? Interpreting the BPCIA’s Patent Provisions, 31 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 659, 659 (2016). 
7.  Id.  
8.  See Gu et al., supra note 4 (for example, in the U.S. 90% of patients with arthritis received 
etanercept, adalimumab or infliximab and the biologic costs per treated patient in the first year for the 
above biologics were “US$24,859 (etanercept), US$26,537 (adalimumab), and US$26,468 
(infliximab).”). 
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high prices are partially due to “over-patenting” or “patent thickets” that 
bar biosimilars from entering the market.9 However, no literature has 
thoroughly explored this issue or discussed why this phenomenon is 
possible. This article attempts to address this gap. 
In the next part, this article first provides an overview of biologics and 
biosimilars, including the differences between biologics and small-
molecule drugs; the BPCIA’s efforts to drive down drug prices by 
increasing competition and introducing biosimilars; and how this effort is 
not sufficient due to multiple barriers. Part III then demonstrates that one of 
the barriers is patent thickets by conducting an empirical study on 
comparing the patents of the top-selling biologics and small-molecule 
drugs. Part IV carries out an in-depth analysis, arguing that there are two 
types of patent thickets (termed Type I Patent Thickets and Type II Patent 
Thickets respectively in this article) in the so-called “patent thicket.” As 
Part V and Part VI explain, while the two types of patent thickets jointly 
contribute to the complexity of patent litigation and hence the high drug 
prices, the two types of patent thickets are formed due to different reasons. 
While the existence of patents in the two types of patent thickets are not 
wholly without merits, the harmful impacts are real. To balance the interest 
of multiple stakeholders, Part VII first discusses how current legislative 
proposals may assist in increasing the transparency of the problem and act 
as ex post regulation. However, it is more desirable to prevent the 
undesirable impacts beforehand. As such, Part VII also presents two ex 
ante regulation proposals with one being a tweak the USPTO can 
implement to alleviate the effects of Type II Patent Thickets and the other 
being a more transformative reform that would target both types of patent 
thickets collectively without completely sacrificing the benefits patents 
provide. Part VIII concludes. 
 
9.  See, e.g., Danny Hakim, Humira’s Best-Selling Drug Formula: Start at a High Price. Go 
Higher, N. Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/ (stating that Abbvie Inc.’s aggressive 
patent strategy has muted competition and contributed to the success of its drug pricing strategy); Peter 
Loftus & Denise Roland, By Adding Patents, Drugmaker Keeps Cheaper Humira Copies Out of U.S., 
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 6, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/; Abuse of the Patent System is Keeping Drug Prices 
High for Patients, ASS’N FOR ACCESSIBLE MED., https://accessiblemeds.org/ (last visited Jun. 22, 
2019); Remarks from FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb, M.D., as Prepared for Delivery at the 
Brookings Institution on the Release of the FDA’s Biosimilars Action Plan, US. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. 
(July. 18, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/. 
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II. BIOLOGICS AND BIOSIMILARS 
Before delving into the biologic patent thicket issue, it is imperative to 
understand what biologics and biosimilars are. Section A first covers the 
complex nature of biologics and what makes them different from 
traditional small-molecule drugs. The complicated characteristics of 
biologics give rise to the challenges in their manufacture and immensely 
impact, as Section B entails, the development, the cost, and also the 
booming market thereof. Although the biologic market is prospering, 
patients are suffering from the high cost of biologics.10 Section C turns to 
discuss what biosimilars are and how they and the BPCIA are supposed to 
drive down biologic prices. Unfortunately, current biosimilars face 
significant barriers to market entry.11 As Section D presents, these hurdles 
include scientific and manufacturing challenges; strict regulatory 
compliances; the presence of patents; and the acceptance of physicians and 
patients. 
A. What Are Biologics? 
Pharmaceutical drugs can be roughly categorized into chemical 
compound (small-molecule) drugs or biological products (biologics).12 
Small-molecule drugs usually consist of a pure chemical substance, have a 
well-defined structure, and can be thoroughly characterized.13 Therefore, 
once the active ingredient is known, small molecule drugs can be 
synthesized chemically relatively easily.14 Biologics, on the other hand, are 
not so easily defined in structure due to their complex nature.15 The BPCIA 
defines a biologic as “a virus, therapeutic serum, toxin, antitoxin, vaccine, 
blood, blood component or derivative, allergenic product, protein (except 
any chemically synthesized polypeptide), or analogous product, or 
arsphenamine or derivative of arsphenamine (or any other trivalent organic 
arsenic compound), applicable to the prevention, treatment, or cure of a 
 
10.  See infra Part II.B. 
11.  See infra Part II.D. 
12.  See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 1. 
13.  Id. 
14.  See id. 
15.  Id.  
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disease or condition of human beings.”16 In simple terms, biologics are 
large therapeutic protein molecules created by living cells.17 
A (therapeutic) protein’s structure is fundamentally complicated and is 
determined during its manufacture and synthesis.18 Since the unique three-
dimensional structure specifies the properties of proteins and is essential to 
their correct functioning, biologics are primarily dependent on their 
manufacturing process.19 Coupled with the fact that biologics are created 
by living cells—which are very sensitive to alterations in conditions— a 
slight difference in the manufacturing process, equipment or facilities could 
result in drastic changes to the final product.20 These changes could affect 
the purity, potency, safety, or even the clinical identity of the biologic.21 
Thus, as Hirsch accurately summarizes, for a biologic, “the process is the 
product, and the product is the process.”22 
B. The Development, the Cost and the Market of Biologics 
Due to the aforementioned complexity of biologics and the need for 
more diversified resources, biologic manufacturers generally spend a 
significant amount of expense on research and development.23 As a 
reference point, the development cost for the antibody-drug conjugate 
Brentuximab vedotin24 was estimated to be US$ 899.2 million.25 Besides, 
manufacturers also spend considerable expenses on complying to the strict 
 
16.  42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(1) (2017). 
17.  See Dov Hirsch, The Riddle of the Mysterious Patent Dance Wrapped in an Enigma: Is the 
Patent Dance of the BPCIA Optional or Mandatory?, 27 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 
645, 650 (2017). 
18.  See Elysa B. Goldberg, Fixing a Hole: Will Generic Biologics Find a Niche Within the Hatch-
Waxman Act?, 20 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 327, 333 (2009); U.S. FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN., supra note 1.  
19.  See MARY K. CAMPBELL & SHAWN O. FARRELL, BIOCHEMISTRY, 84 (7th ed. 2011). 
20.  U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 1. 
21.  Arthur J. Chirino & Anthony Mire-Sluis, Characterizing Biological Products and Assessing 
Comparability Following Manufacturing Changes, 22 NATURE BIOTECH. 1383, 1384 (2004); see U.S. 
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 1. 
22.  Hirsch, supra note 17 at 652. 
23.  See Goldberg, supra note 18.  
24.  Niels W. C.J. van de Donk & Eugen Dhimolea, Brentuximab Vedotin, 4 MABS 458, 458, 465 
(2012) (explaining that Brentuximab vedotin is “an anti-CD30 antibody conjugated via a protease-
cleavable linker to the potent anti-microtubule agent monomethyl auristatin E (MMAE)” and it “offers 
an important new therapeutic option for patients with heavily pretreated relapsed/refractory Hodgkin 
lymphoma, systemic ALCL, and primary cutaneous CD30-positive lymphoproliferative disorders.”).  
25.  Vinay Prasad & Sham Mailankody, Research and Development Spending to Bring a Single 
Cancer Drug to Market and Revenues After Approval, 177 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1569, 1571 (2017). 
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regulations on the manufacture, approval process, and marketing of 
biologics.26 
For a biologic to enter the market, it is required by law to undergo 
convoluted development approval processes and clinical trials.27 The 
process starts with basic research and preclinical studies where scientists 
search and test for potential biologic candidates in glass tubes, cultured 
cells and subsequently in live animals.28 To complicate matters, preclinical 
studies for biologic candidates require additional protein purification and 
recipient immune response monitoring.29 If all goes well in preclinical 
trials, an Investigational New Drug (IND) application may be submitted to 
the Food and Drug Administration.30 The approval of the application 
allows the biologic candidate to be tested on humans.31 The biologic 
candidate then proceeds to undergo three phases of clinical trials where 
drug safety, efficacy, and regulatory compliance are examined, with each 
phase having a larger pool of recipients than the preceding phase.32 If the 
clinical trials are successful, a Biologics License Application (BLA) may 
be submitted to the FDA for review; and if the application is approved, the 
biologic may finally enter the market.33 The entire development and 
approval process usually takes up at least twelve years.34 
However, the daunting development cost and stringent regulations 
have not scared off pharmaceutical companies.35 On the contrary, 
 
26.  See Hirsch, supra note 17, at 656; see, e.g., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 1 (“Since 
there is a significant difference in how biological products are made, the production is monitored by the 
agency from the early stages to make sure the final product turns out as expected.”). 
27.  See Richard C. Mohs & Nigel H. Greig, Drug Discovery and Development: Role of Basic 
Biological Research, 3 ALZHEIMER’S & DEMENTIA 651, 656, 656 fig.5 (2017) (for instance, fig 5. 
presents a general view of the biologic development process). 
28.  See INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACAD.  COMM. ON ACCELERATING RARE DISEASES RES. 
AND ORPHAN PROD. DEV. § 1 (Marilyn J. Field & Thomas F. Boat eds., 2010).  
29.  See id. (“The production of sufficient quantities of a biologic for preclinical and clinical 
development studies requires unique approaches for expression of the proteins and their purification to 
regulatory standards. . .Second, biologics can potentially elicit an immune response in the recipient. 
This response must be monitored very closely because it is not always predictable. Thus, biologics may 
present special issues to be addressed in preclinical studies, such as immunogenicity (i.e., induction of 
an antibody response) and immunotoxicity (agents intended to stimulate or suppress the immune system 
may cause cell-mediated changes.)”).  
30.  Id.  § 2. 
31.  See id. 
32.  See id.  §§ 2-4. 
33.  See id.  §§ 4, 5. (Note that the FDA will still constantly review and monitor approved drugs 
(phase IV) for their safety or efficacy). 
34.  Mohs & Greig, supra note 27, at 651.  
35.  Emily Waltz, It’s Official: Biologics Are Pharma’s Darlings, 32 NATURE BIOTECH. 117, 117 
(2014) (“Biologics have replaced small-molecules as the dominant focus of big pharma’s pipeline . . .”). 
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pharmaceutical companies have shifted their R&D focus from small-
molecule drugs onto biologics.36 Driving forces may include the innovative 
mechanism of biologics, the ability to raise higher prices, and the 
diminishing patent lives of small-molecules.37 In 2018, the U.S. approved a 
total of 207 new entities (including chemical compounds and biologics) 
wherein 47% of them were biologics,38 a substantial increase compared to 
previous years.39 Data also show that molecular antibodies (hereinafter 
mAbs) are gradually dominating, taking up to 53% of all approvals (both 
biologics and biosimilars) in the U.S. and EU.40 Currently, mAbs are 
perhaps the most lucrative single product class, with total sales topping 
over US$ 128 billion in 2018.41 As a matter of fact, the most lucrative 
biologic is the mAb, Humira.42 Marketed by Abbvie, Inc., the mega-
blockbuster biologic earned US$ 18 billion in 2017 global sales.43 
While the market is flourishing, patients are suffering from the 
astounding high prices of biologic treatments.44 For instance, the 
monoclonal antibody biologic against autoimmune disease infliximab costs 
a patient US$ 26,468 annually.45 High biologic prices should not come as a 
great surprise considering its complex nature, challenging manufacture, and 
stringent regulations. Nevertheless, for the sake of public interest and 
affordable healthcare, biologic prices should be reduced. A purportedly 
effective way to do so is by increasing competition in the biologics market. 
 
36.  Id. 
37.  See id. 
38.  See Gary Walsh, Biopharmaceutical Benchmarks 2018, 36 NATURE BIOTECH. 1136, 1137 
(2018). 
39.  See id. (The percentage of genuinely new biologic approvals among new entity approvals in 
2010 and 2014 were 21% and 26% respectively).  
40.  Id.  
41.  Id. at 1138.  
42.  See INITIATIVE FOR MED., ACCESS & KNOWLEDGE, OVERPATENTED, OVERPRICED: HOW 
EXCESSIVE PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTING IS EXTENDING MONOPOLIES AND DRIVING UP DRUG PRICES 
3 (2018),  http://www.i-mak.org/.  
43.  Id.  
44.  See Gu et al., supra note 4, at 369 (for example, in the U.S. 90% of patients with arthritis 
received etanercept, adalimumab or infliximab and the biologic costs per treated patient in the first year 
for the above biologics were US$ 24,859 for etanercept; US$ 26,537 for adalimumab; and US$ 26,468 
for infliximab).  
45.  See Gu et al., supra note 4.  
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C. Biosimilars and the BPCIA as the Solution to High Biologic Prices 
Driving down drug prices with increased competition through 
expedited approval pathways is not without precedent.46 In 1984, the U.S. 
Congress enacted the Drug Price Competition and Patent Restoration Act47
—also known as the Hatch-Waxman Act—to incentivize lower-cost 
generic (small-molecule) drugs to enter the market.48 Under the Act, 
manufacturers only need to demonstrate that their generic drug candidate is 
“pharmaceutically equivalent” and “bioequivalent” to an approved drug.49 
The Act thus significantly decreased the time and cost spent on proving the 
drug’s clinical safety and efficacy; and subsequently lowered the price of 
drugs.50 
However, the regulatory structure of the Hatch-Waxman Act is 
somewhat inapplicable to biologics.51 For biologics, it is often impossible 
to demonstrate bioequivalence—an essential requirement under the Hatch-
Waxman Act.52 The difficulty lies in the complex nature and the 
substantially variable manufacture of biologics.53 Hence, as a means to 
address the high biologic prices and to serve as the biologic equivalent 
pathway of the Hatch-Waxman Act, the U.S. Congress passed the BPCIA 
in 2009. Under the BPCIA, approval is based upon “biosimilarity” instead 
of “bioequivalence.”54 
1. Biosimilarity and interchangeability 
A “biosimilar”—the entity claiming “biosimilarity”—is a biologic 
product that is “highly similar to the reference product55 notwithstanding 
minor differences in clinically inactive components; and [has] no clinically 
meaningful differences between the biological product and the reference 
 
46.  See Alexej Ladonnikov, The Biosimilar Patent Dance - If You Don’t Dance, You’re No 
Friend of Mine, 35 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 135, 138 (2018); see Cindy Navarro, It Takes Two 
to Tango: The BPCIA’s Mandatory Patent Dance, 45 AIPLA Q.J. 291, 298 (2017). 
47.  Drug Price Competition and Patent Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 
1585 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C., 35 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.). 
48.  Margo A. Bagley, Patent Term Restoration and Non-Patent Exclusivity in the US, in 
PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION, COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW 111, 114 (Josef Drexl & Nari Lee 
eds., 2013). 
49.  Id.  
50.  See id. 
51.  Ladonnikov, supra note 46, at 139.  
52.  Bagley, supra note 48, at 134.  
53.  See id. 
54.  42 U.S.C. § 262(k); see Bagley, supra note 48, at 134. 
55.  Id. § 262(i)(4) (explaining a reference product is an approved biologic the biosimilar claims 
“biosimilarity” to.). 
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product in terms of the safety, purity, and potency of the product.”56 To 
determine “highly similarity” to the reference product, extensive analysis 
of the structure and function of the reference product and the biosimilar 
candidate needs to be conducted.57 The characteristics analyzed include 
purity, chemical identity, and bioactivity.58 Minor differences between the 
biosimilar candidate and the reference product in clinically inactive sites 
are acceptable but should be closely monitored and evaluated upon 
examination for approval.59 Besides proving highly similarity, biosimilar 
applicants also need to demonstrate that the biosimilar candidate has no 
clinically meaningful differences between the reference product.60 This 
demonstration is generally carried out through human pharmacokinetic 
(exposure) and pharmacodynamic (response) studies, and clinical 
immunogenicity assessments.61 
The BPCIA also establishes a pathway where manufacturers can apply 
for “interchangeability.”62 An “interchangeable product” is a biosimilar that 
meets additional requirements where the proposed interchangeable product 
“can be expected to produce the same clinical result as the reference 
product in any given patient; and for a biological product that is 
administered more than once to an individual, the risk in terms of safety or 
diminished efficacy of alternating or switching between use of the 
biological product and the reference product is not greater than the risk of 
using the reference product without such alternation or switch.”63 As an 
incentive of achieving interchangeability, the BPCIA grants the first 
interchangeable product of each reference product  one year of 
exclusivity.64 Within such period, the FDA will not approve any subsequent 
interchangeable product applications referencing the same reference 
product.65 However, as of November 2019, no biosimilar has achieved 
interchangeability status.66 
 
56.  Id. § 262(i)(2). 
57.  Biosimilar and Interchangeable Products, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/ 
(last visited Mar. 18, 2019). 
58.  Id. 
59.  Id. 
60.  Id. 
61.  Id. 
62.  42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(4). 
63.  Id. §§ 262(k)(4)(A)(ii), (B). 
64.  Id. § 262(k)(6). 
65.  Id. 
66.  See Purple Book: Lists of Licensed Biological Products with Reference Product Exclusivity 
and Biosimilarity or Interchangeability Evaluations, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/  
(last updated Nov. 5, 2019). 
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By providing a pathway to claim biosimilarity and interchangeability, 
the BPCIA allows biologic applicants having products similar to an 
approved biologic waive the requirement to individually establish the 
safety and effectiveness of the proposed products.67 By doing so, 
significant drug development time and costs are saved; and patient 
treatment costs should theoretically be reduced as a consequence.68 When 
granting benefits to the biosimilar manufacturers, the BPCIA must also 
consider the interests of the reference product sponsors. The BPCIA 
guarantees twelve years of regulatory exclusivity (wherein the FDA will 
not approve any biosimilars referencing to that biologic).69 In fact, the FDA 
will not even accept any biosimilar applications within the first four years 
the reference product is approved.70 
2. BPCIA’s patent dispute resolution system 
Another mechanism established by the BPCIA to accelerate 
biosimilars to market is its patent dispute resolution system,71 or more 
colloquially referred to as the “patent dance.”72 A patent dispute resolution 
process is crucial under the current BPCIA regulatory scheme because 
unlike the Hatch-Waxman, the BPCIA does not demand the publication of 
a list of patents that cover the approved biologics.73 The patent dance aims 
to identify patents that are likely subject to future litigations and to trigger 
immediate lawsuits in the hopes of resolving the disputes as early as 
possible.74 The patent dance is a two-stage process that provides a means 
 
67.  See Biosimilar Development, Review, and Approval, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
https://www.fda.gov/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2019) (“[A] manufacturer that shows its proposed biosimilar 
product is highly similar to and has no clinically meaningful differences from the FDA-approved 
reference product may rely in part on FDA’s previous determination of safety and effectiveness for the 
reference product for approval. This generally means that biosimilar manufacturers do not need to 
conduct as many expensive and lengthy clinical trials, potentially leading to faster access to these 
products, additional therapeutic options, and reduced costs for patients.”). 
68.  See id.  
69.  42 U.S.C. §§ 262(k)(7)(A). 
70.  Id. §§ 262(k)(7)(B). 
71.   Id. § 262(l) (The patent dispute resolution system, or the “patent dance”, refers to the patent 
disclosure requirement in 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)). 
72.  Lindsay Kelly, Biologics in the Practice of Law, 39 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 21, 25 (2016). 
73.  See Carl J. Minniti III, Sandoz v.  Amgen: Why Current Interpretation of the Biologic Price 
Competition and Innovation Act of 2009 Is Flawed and Jeopardizes Future Competition, 97 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 172, 178 (2009). But see Biologic Patent Transparency Act, S.659, 116th 
Cong. (2019) (a bill sponsored by Senators Susan M. Collins and Tim Kaine that requires the disclosure 
of patents claiming to cover FDA approved biologics in the purple book.); Purple Book Continuity Act 
of 2019, H.R.1520, 116th Cong. (2019) (a bill that requires the disclosure of patent exchange 
information); Part VII.B., infra. 
74.  See Minniti III, supra note 73, at 178. 
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for biosimilar applicants and reference product sponsors to exchange 
information and for the parties themselves to determine the patents for 
litigation.75 
The first stage of the patent dance starts, if at all, after the biosimilar 
applicant (hereinafter, Applicant) submits an abbreviated Biologic License 
Application (hereinafter, aBLA), creating an artificial infringement.76 
Within 20 days of the submission, the Applicant should (1) notify the 
reference product sponsor (hereinafter, RPS) their biosimilar application 
and provide a copy of the application and relevant manufacturing 
information to the RPS.77 Within 60 days of the reception of (1), the RPS 
should provide (2) a list of patents the RPS believes the Applicant’s 
biosimilar will infringe and the patents the RPS is willing to license, if 
any.78 After receiving (2), the Applicant should provide (3) a list of patents 
that the Applicant believes its biosimilar has infringed if any; a statement 
describing, on a claim by claim basis, why all the patents listed by the RPS 
are not enforceable, invalid, or will not be infringed by the Applicant’s 
biosimilar; or a statement that the Applicant will not market the biosimilar 
before the expiration of the patents.79 Within 60 days of receiving (3), the 
RPS should provide (4) a statement in response to (3), explaining the 
validity, enforceability of the patents and that why the Applicant’s 
biosimilar will infringe the patents.80 Upon receipt of (4), the parties should 
negotiate in good faith on which of the listed patents should be litigated.81 
If there is an agreement, the RPS should file a patent infringement suit on 
the agreed patents within 30 days.82 If both parties do not reach an 
agreement regarding (4) within 15 days, the parties shall exchange (5) a list 
of patents that each believes should be litigated.83 The number of patents 
on the RPS’s list cannot exceed that of the Applicant’s unless the Applicant 
lists none, in which the RPS should list one.84 Within 30 days of the list 
 
75.  See Minniti III, supra note 73 at 179 (“[B]y engaging in required exchanges of information 
regarding patents claimed to cover the reference product, the parties themselves determine the number 
of patents subject to litigation [emphasis added]”). But see Ladonnikov, supra note 43, at 145  (stating 
that the patent dance is not mandatory according to Sandoz v. Amgen, 137 S. Ct. 1664, 1668-69 (2017); 
thus, the patent dance is more of a provided means than a requirement.) 
76.  35 U.S.C § 271(e)(2)(C); 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(2). 
77.  42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(2). 
78.  Id. § 262(l)(3)(A). 
79.  Id.  § 262(l)(3)(B). 
80.  Id. § 262(l)(3)(C). 
81.  Id. § 262(l)(4)(A). 
82.  Id. § 262(l)(6)(A). 
83.  Id. § 262(l)(5)(B)(i). 
84.  Id. § 262(l)(5)(B)(ii). 
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exchange, the RPS may file patent infringement suit on any patents listed 
on (5).85 
The second phase of the patent dance is triggered when the Applicant 
notifies the RPS of its intent to market the biosimilar, in which the 
notification should be 180 days before the date of marketing and regardless 
of the FDA approval of the biosimilar.86 After receiving the notice and 
before the marketing of the biosimilar, the RPS may seek a preliminary 
injunction of the biosimilar concerning any patents listed on (2), (3) or any 
newly issued patent that is not litigated.87 
D. Biosimilar Entry Barriers 
Unfortunately, despite the efforts of the BPCIA, biosimilars are still 
finding it difficult to reach the market.88 According to a data analysis 
conducted by Kaiser Health News, as of January 2019, 57% of the 16,000 
small-molecule drugs approved by the FDA since January 2017 are on 
sale.89 However, within the same period, only 5 of the 13 approved 
biosimilars, or roughly 38%, were launched.90 This rate may indicate that 
biosimilars are facing significant barriers.91 
Although the development of biosimilars is relatively less expensive 
than that of novel biologics, the development cost for biosimilars is still 
high—with estimations up to US$ 200 million for complex molecular 
antibodies.92 The high costs can be explained by referring to the previously 
discussed complex nature of biologics—a minor difference in manufacture 
may result in a dramatically different outcome.93 Coupled with the fact that 
many trade secrets protect manufacturing processes, biosimilar 
manufacturers would have to apply a reverse engineering approach to 
dissect the manufacturing process, which is both expensive and time-
 
85.  Id. § 262(l)(6)(B). 
86.  Id. § 262(l)(8)(A); Sandoz v. Amgen, 137 S. Ct. 1664, 1680 (2017) (“[T]he [A]pplicant may 
provide notice either before or after receiving FDA approval.”). 
87.  42 U.S.C.  §§ 262(l)(7), (8). 
88.  See FDA Approvals, BIG MOLECULE WATCH, https://www.bigmoleculewatch.com/ (last 
updated July 31, 2019) (providing a chart regarding whether the approved biosimilars are launched, in 
which as of Nov 5, 2019, only 9 of 24 approved biosimilars are launched).  
89.  See Sydney Lupkin & Jay Hancock, Trump Administration Salutes Parade of Generic Drug 
Approvals, But Hundreds Aren’t For Sale, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Feb. 7, 2019), https://khn.org/. 
90.  See BIG MOLECULE WATCH, supra note 88. 
91.  See ALEX BRILL & CHRISTY ROBINSON, STEPS TO REDUCING BARRIERS TO BIOSIMILARS IN 
THE UNITED STATES 4 (2018), https://www.boehringer-ingelheim.us/. 
92.  FED. TRADE COMM’N, EMERGING HEALTH CARE ISSUES: FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGIC DRUG 
COMPETITION iii (Jun. 2008), https://www.ftc.gov/. 
93.  U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 1. 
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consuming.94 As outlined previously, manufacturers also need to comply 
with strict regulations to achieve biosimilar status, which includes the 
demonstration of “highly similar” and “having no clinically meaningful 
differences to reference biologics.”95 These requirements may present 
barriers as the demonstration of these characteristics may still require 
expensive clinical trials.96 Another barrier for biosimilars is physician and 
patience acceptance.97 Physicians may either actively think that biosimilars 
have lower quality than their referenced biologics98 or exhibit “prescription 
inertia.”99 To complicate matters, the lack of information among patients 
also presents a problem.100 Finally, patents would also delay the entry of 
biosimilars and present significant challenges. Notably, if multiple patents 
are covering the biologic.101 
III. EVIDENCE OF BIOLOGIC PATENT THICKETS: AN EMPIRICAL 
STUDY 
A rebuttal may be that these hurdles are not unique to biosimilars. 
However, small-molecule generic drugs, despite facing similar 
challenges,102 have nevertheless, successfully driven down drugs prices.103 
For example, Yixin (Iris) Wang et al. showed that the limited efficiency of 
 
94.  See Evelien Moorkens et al., Overcoming Barriers to the Market Access of Biosimilars in the 
European Union: The Case of Biosimilar Monoclonal Antibodies, 7 FRONT PHARMACOLOGY 1, 3 
(2016). 
95.  U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 57. 
96.  See Steven Kozlowsk, Developing the Nation’s Biosimilars Program, 365 NEW ENG. J. OF 
MED. 385, 387-88 (2011). 
97.  BRILL & ROBINSON, supra note 91, at 8. 
98.  Judy Crespi-Lofton & Jann B. Skelton, The Growing Role of Biologics and Biosimilars in the 
United States: Perspectives from the APhA Biologics and Biosimilars Stakeholder Conference, 57 J.  
AM. PHARM. ASSOC. e1, e5 (2017). 
99.  BRILL & ROBINSON, supra note 91, at 8. 
100. See BRILL & ROBINSON, supra note 91, at 8 (stating that 70% of U.S. respondents in the 
general population from a recent survey had never heard of biosimilars and 54% of patients have never 
heard of biosimilars.). 
101. INITIATIVE FOR MED., ACCESS & KNOWLEDGE, supra note 42. 
102. See e.g., Yixin (Iris) Wang et al., Manufacturing and Regulatory Barriers to Generic Drug 
Competition: A Structural Model Approach 33 (Mar. 21, 2018), http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3145635 
(for example, the manufacturing complexity and regulation processing barriers); see William H. Shrank 
et al., Physician Perceptions About Generic Drugs, 45 ANN PHARMACOTHERAPY 31, 34 (2011). 
103. See Garth Boehm et al., Development of the Generic Drug Industry in the US After the 
Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984, 3 ACTA PHARM. SINICA B 297, 309 (2013); see also Atanu Saha et al., 
Generic Competition in the US Pharmaceutical Industry, 13 INT’L J. ECON. BUS. 15, 35 (2006) (stating 
that “results show that brand prices do react to generic competition; each additional entrant is associated 
with a 0.2% average decline in brand prices”); Generic Competition and Drug Prices, U.S. FOOD & 
DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/ (last updated: Nov. 20, 2017). 
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the generic approval pathway might impair market competition;104 and 
Shrank et al. demonstrated that although the majority of selected U.S. 
physicians are comfortable with the prescription and efficacy of generics, 
there still consists of a meaningful proportion of physicians that are 
concerned about the quality of generics.105 However, as this Part 
demonstrates, biosimilar manufacturers face more patents in contrast to 
small-molecule generics. These patents, or “patent thickets,” has, in turn, 
resulted in a lower launch to approval ratio for biosimilars compared to 
small-molecule drugs.106 Without biosimilar competition in the market, 
brand name biologics would have the luxury to raise drug prices at will.107 
To demonstrate the so-called “patent thickets” biosimilar 
manufacturers encounter, this Part conducts an empirical study regarding 
the patents that cover the top-selling biologics and small-molecule drugs in 
the U.S.. Section A first covers what a patent thicket is while Section B 
discusses the recent criticism against biologic patent thickets. Next, Section 
C presents the research method of the empirical study, including how the 
top-selling drugs in the U.S. were selected; how the patents of these drugs 
were retrieved and filtered; and how these results are presented in Section 
D. Before dissecting patent thickets, Section E conducts a preliminary 
analysis on the patent counts of these selected drugs. 
A. What Is a Patent Thicket? 
A patent thicket is “a dense web of overlapping intellectual property 
rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually 
commercialize new technology;”108 or more simply put: “multiple patents 
that cover a single product or technology.”109 The term probably first came 
up in the 1970s110 regarding an antitrust lawsuit against Xerox, in which the 
plaintiff, SCM Corporation, claims that Xerox had “created a ‘patent 
thicket’ strong enough to prevent SCM and others from making plain‐paper 
 
104. Wang et al., supra note 102 
105. Shrank et al., supra note 102, at 36. 
106. See BIG MOLECULE WATCH, supra note 88. 
107. See Hakim, supra note 9. 
108. Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard 
Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POL’Y AND THE ECO. 119, 120 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2001), 
https://www.nber.org/chapters/c10778.pdf.  
109. Ian Ayres & Gideon Parchomovsky, Tradable Patent Rights, 60 STAN. L. REV. 863, 864 
(2007). 
110. See Ayres & Parchomovsky, supra note 109, at 894 n.5. 
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office copiers.”111 Some literature has also added that a patent thicket exists 
when the owners of these overlapping rights belong to more than one 
entity.112 However, for the sake of discussing biologic patent thickets, this 
article does not add this premise to the patent thicket definition. This 
decision is because the purpose of this article is to discuss the “formidable 
wall of patents” established by the reference product sponsor (or the brand 
biologic company), which is a single entity (or its subdivisions) rather than 
different entities. 
When discussing biologic patent thickets, the concept of 
“evergreening” must also be introduced. When drug companies evergreen, 
they “extend the market exclusivity of a drug beyond the life of its original 
patent by obtaining multiple patents that cover different aspects of that 
drug, including the active ingredient, formulations, methods of 
manufacturing, chemical intermediates, mechanisms of actions, packaging, 
screening methods, and biological targets.”113 Generally, evergreening is 
more of seeking an economic advantage than searching a more therapeutic 
advantage.114 Evergreening is hardly anything new, even for branded small-
molecule drug companies.115 
The difference between patent thickets and patent evergreen is that the 
concern of the former is the number of patents while that of the latter is the 
increased year span of the collective patent term. However, it should be 
stressed that the extents of patent thickets and patent evergreening do 
interplay with one another, with the former having the inherent capability 
to achieve the latter.116 
 
111. Robert J. Cole, SCM v. Xerox: Paper Blizzard for $1.8 Billion, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 27, 1997), 
https://www.nytimes.com/. 
112. See, e.g., Adam Mossoff, The Rise and Fall of the First American Patent Thicket: The 
Sewing Machine War of the 1850s, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 165, 166–67 (2011) (“A ‘patent thicket’ exists 
when too many patents covering individual elements of a commercial product are separately owned by 
different entities.” (emphasis added)); Stu Woolman et al., Evidence of Patent Thickets in Complex 
Biopharmaceutical Technologies, 53 IDEA 1, 2 (2013) (“A patent thicket exists when two or more 
parties have overlapping patent rights and a potential manufacturer must negotiate licenses with each 
patent owner in order to bring a product to market without infringing on the rights of the patentees.” 
(emphasis added)).   
113. Jodie Liu, Compulsory Licensing and Anti-Evergreening: Interpreting the TRIPS Flexibilities 
in Sections 84 and 3(d) of the Indian Patents Act, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J. 207, 220 (2015). 
114. Roger Collier, Drug Patents: The Evergreening Problem, 185 CMAJ e385, e385 (2013). 
115. See Robin Feldman, May Your Drug Price Be Evergreen, UC HASTINGS RES. PAPER no. 256, 
49 (October 29, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3061567 (showing that “40% of all [small-molecule] 
drugs available on the market created additional market barriers by adding patents or exclusivities.”). 
116. See infra Part V.B. 
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B. Biologic Patent Thickets 
In its answer and counterclaims against AbbVie, Inc. (hereinafter, 
“AbbVie”), Boehringer Ingelheim International GmbH, Boehringer 
Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc., and Boehringer Ingelheim Fremont, Inc. 
(hereinafter, Boehringer Ingelheim) accused AbbVie of deliberately 
forming a “patent thicket” to block out competitors.117 Boehringer 
Ingelheim explicitly stated that, 
“all 74 patents listed in paragraphs 57-58 of [AbbVie’s] 
complaint118, which Plaintiffs identified as the then-existing 
patents for which a claim of patent infringement could 
reasonably be asserted with respect to the BLA Product, were 
issued between 2012 and 2017 . . .  stem from less than half 
as many patent families . . . share common specifications and 
have overlapping and nearly identical claims. . . .Many of 
Plaintiffs’ patents from different families also have 
substantially similar disclosures and claims, despite claiming 
priority to different applications.”119 
 Indeed, in a presentation regarding AbbVie’s strategy in 2015, the 
company has proudly presented its broad U.S. Humira®—AbbVie’s brand 
name for adalimumab—”patent estate,” describing 75 patents covering 
formulations, treatment uses and manufacturing processes of the drug.120 
Furthermore, in 2019, Richard Gonzalez, CEO of AbbVie, acknowledged 
the company’s success on securing 136 patents on Humira®.121 
However, AbbVie is not alone. Others have also condemned other 
biologic manufacturers for similar actions.122 To further explore this issue 
 
117. REDACTED VERSION of 208 MOTION for Leave to File Amended Answer by Boehringer 
Ingelheim Fremont, Inc., Boehringer Ingelheim International GMBH, Boehringer Ingelheim 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. at 70, AbbVie Inc. et al v. Boehringer Ingelheim International GMBH et al, 
CIVIL No. 17-1065-MSG-RL (D. Del. Sep. 21, 2018) (No. 209) (hereinafter, “BI’s Motion for Leave to 
File Amended Answers”) (“[o]n information and belief, Plaintiffs engaged in a pattern of pursuing 
numerous overlapping and non-inventive patents for the purpose of developing a “patent thicket,” using 
the patenting process itself as a means to seek to delay competition against its expensive and lucrative 
adalimumab product. That strategy has generated, according to paragraph 18 of Plaintiffs’ complaint, 
more than 100 patents.”). 
118. Complaint, AbbVie Inc. et al v. Boehringer Ingelheim International GMBH et al, CIVIL No. 
17-1065-MSG-RL (D. Del. Aug. 2, 2017) (No. 1) (hereinafter, “AbbVie v. BI complaint”). 
119. BI’s Motion for Leave to File Amended Answers at 70. 
120. Richard Gonzalez, AbbVie Long-Term Strategy at 14 (2015), 
http://www.biotechduediligence.com/. 
121. Joe Cahill, Taking Aim at Humira’s Patent Fortress, CRAIN’S CHI. BUS. (Mar. 01, 2019), 
https://www.chicagobusiness.com/. 
122. See, e.g., Zachary Silbersher, Did AbbVie Create a Wrongful “Patent Thicket” Around 
Humira®?, MARKMAN ADVISORS (Aug. 27, 2018), https://www.markmanadvisors.com/ (stating that if 
Boehringer Ingelheim’s counterclaims against AbbVie works could impact biologics sold by Roche, 
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and to prove that biologic patent thickets do exist, analysis on granted U.S. 
patents covering Humira®, Enbrel®, and Rituxan® (known as MabThera® 
outside of the US) —the top-three-selling biologics in the U.S based on 
2018 sales revenue—were conducted. Furthermore, to serve as a control 
group for comparison, patent searches on U.S. granted patents covering 
Revlimid®, Eliquis®, and Lyrica®—the top-three-selling small-molecule 
drugs in the U.S. based on 2018 sales revenue—were also carried out. By 
using the relative amount of core and peripheral patents as criteria to assess 
the extent of patent thickets show that among the top best-selling drugs in 
the U.S., biologics tend to form patent thickets compared to small-molecule 
drugs.123 
C. Research Method 
1. Top three best-selling biologics and small-molecule drugs in the 
U.S. based on 2018 sales revenue 
In order to identify the top three best-selling biologics and small-
molecule drugs based on their 2018 U.S. sales revenues, this study first 
identified potential candidates based on Nature’s report on top drugs and 
companies by sales in 2018124 and BioSpace’s report on the top 10 best-
selling drugs in the U.S. based on sales in 2017.125 The candidates were 
categorized into either biologics or small-molecule drugs and ranked 
according to their U.S. sales in U.S. dollars based on the financial reports 
of the companies that market the drug. F. Hoffmann-La Roche (hereinafter, 
Roche) was the only company that did not list its financial data in U.S. 
dollars.126 The company’s U.S. sales revenue statistics were thus converted 
from Swiss Francs (CHF) into U.S. dollars based on the average exchange 
rate of 2018. 
The top three biologics and small-molecule drugs were selected for 
patent research and analysis. The selected biologics, their marketing 
companies and their calculated 2018 U.S. sales revenues are listed in Table 
 
including Avastin®, Herceptin® and Rituxan®, which has also arguably pursued the strategy of 
fortifying against biosimilars with patent thickets). 
123. Three of the top four drugs ranked according to patent counts are biologics. See infra Part 
III.E. The definition of core patents and peripheral patents can be found in Part III.C.4.  
124. Lisa Urquhart, Top Drugs and Companies by Sales in 2018, 18 NATURE REV. 245, 245 
(2019). 
125. Mark Terry, Drum Roll, Please! Top 10 Bestselling Drugs in the U.S., BIOSPACE (May 21, 
2018), https://www.biospace.com/ . 
126. See Investor Update, F. HOFFMANN-LA ROCHE  15 (Jan. 31, 2019), https://www.roche.com/. 
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1 below; and the selected small-molecule drugs and their related 
information are listed in Table 2 below. 
 
Table 1: Top Three Best-Selling Biologics Based on 2018 U.S. 
revenue 
Ranking 
Marketing 
Company 
Brand 
Drug Name 
2018 U.S. Sales 
(in US dollars) 
1 AbbVie Humira® 13.69 billion127 
2 Amgen128 Enbrel® 4.81 billion129 
3 Roche/Biogen130 Rituxan® 4.39 billion131 
 
Table 2: Top Three Best-Selling Small-Molecule Drugs Based on 
2018 U.S. Revenue 
Ranking 
Marketing 
Company 
Brand 
Drug Name 
2018 U.S. Sales 
(in US dollars) 
1 Celgene132 Revlimid®  6.47 billion133 
2 BMS134/Pfizer135 Eliquis® 5.61 billion136 
3 Pfizer Lyrica® 3.69 billion137 
 
127. AbbVie Reports Full-Year and Fourth-Quarter 2018 Financial Results, ABBVIE, INC. (Jan. 
25, 2019), https://news.abbvie.com/. 
128. Amgen, Inc. [hereinafter Amgen]. Enbrel® is marketed by Amgen in the U.S. and by Pfizer 
Inc. and Takeda Pharmaceutical Company Ltd. outside of U.S. See Eric Palmer, Enbrel, 
FIERCEPHARMA, https://www.fiercepharma.com/special-report/enbrel (last visited Jun. 28, 2019). 
129. Amgen Reports Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2018 Financial Results, AMGEN, INC. (Jan. 29, 
2019), https://www.amgen.com/media/news-releases/2019/01/amgen-reports-fourth-quarter-and-full-
year-2018-financial-results/. 
130 Biogen, Inc. [hereinafter as Biogen].  
131. Even though Biogen co-markets Rituxan® with Roche, due to Biogen not disclosing its 
Rituxan® 2018 U.S. revenue, the revenue of Rituxan® is based only on Roche’s financial report. See 
Biogen Inc. Annual Report on Form 10-k for the Year Ended December 31, 2018, BIOGEN, INC. 63, 
http://www.annualreports.com/ (last visited Jun. 28, 2019) (stating Biogen’s share of pre-tax profits in 
the U.S. for both Rituxan® and Gazya® is US$ 1,431.9 million in total; but not stating the revenue of 
each product individually). Roche listed Rituxan®’s U.S. sales as 4.29 billion in Swiss Franc (CHF), 
which is approximately US$ 4.39 billion using the average US dollar Swiss Franc exchange rate in 
2018. F. HOFFMANN-LA ROCHE, supra note 126; Average Foreign Exchange Rates as per End of 
December 2018, CREDIT SUISSE, https://www.credit-suisse.com/ (last visited: Apr. 30, 2019). 
132. Celgene Corporation [hereinafter as Celgene]. 
133. Celgene Reports Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2018 Operating and Financial Results, 
CELGENE CORP., https://ir.celgene.com/  (last visited Jan. 31, 2019). 
134. Bristol-Myers Squibb Company [hereinafter as BMS]. 
135. Pfizer, Inc. [hereinafter as Pfizer]. 
136. Eliquis®’s U.S. sales in 2018 was calculated by adding the sales revenue generated by BMS 
and Pfizer. BMS generated US$ 3.76 billion in sales. Bristol-Myers Squibb Reports Fourth Quarter and 
Full Year Financial Results, BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB 11, https://s21.q4cdn.com/ (last visited Jan. 24, 
2019). Pfizer generated US$ 1.849 billion in sales. Appendix A 2018 Financial Report, PFIZER, INC. 26, 
https://s21.q4cdn.com/ (last visited Jun. 28, 2019). 
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2. Patent retrieval of the top three best-selling biologics in the U.S. 
based on 2018 sales revenue 
a. In general 
The scope of this study is limited to U.S. granted patents and does not 
include U.S. patent applications or other patent-related documents outside 
of the U.S. The patent searches were done on April 30th, 2019 using the 
U.S. Official Patent Full Text and Image Database (hereinafter, USPTO 
patent database). 
In order to identify possible keywords for the search queries, this 
study referenced information about the selected drugs from the U.S. Food 
& Drug Administration’s “Drugs@FDA: FDA Approved Drug Products” 
database138 (hereinafter, Drugs@FDA) and the “DrugBank” database139 
(hereinafter, DrugBank). The search queries included the names of the 
marketing company and its related subsidiary firm names; the name of the 
drugs; and fragmented or variations of mechanism-related keywords. Table 
3 shows the search queries used for the patent search for the selected 
biologics and the count of hits these search queries have retrieved. 
Anticipated patent expiration dates were retrieved through Google 
Patent Search140 results or calculated using the USPTO patent term 
calculator141 based on data retrieved from USPTO’s public patent 
application information retrieval (hereinafter, “USPTO Public PAIR”).142 
 
Table 3: Biologic Patent Search Query and Count of Hits 
 
Brand 
Drug Name 
Search Query 
in “Claims”  
Search Query 
in “Assignee 
Name”  
Number of 
Hits143 
 
137. PFIZER, INC., supra note 136, at 25. 
138. Drugs@FDA: FDA Approved Drug Products, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/daf/index.cfm. 
139. DRUGBANK, https://www.drugbank.ca/ (last visited Jun. 28, 2019). 
140. GOOGLE PATENTS, https://www.google.com/?tbm=pts (last visited Jun. 28, 2019). 
141. Patent Term Calculator, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., 
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/patent_term_calculator.xls. (last visited Jun. 28, 
2019). 
142. USPTO Public Patent Application Information Retrieval, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., 
https://portal.uspto.gov/pair/PublicPair (last visited Jun. 28, 2019). 
143. The patents retrieved by these search queries are only raw data. Cross-examination of this 
raw data with other databases to include missed patents and to exclude irrelevant patents will further 
yield a final result for analysis. 
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Humira®144 
“adalimumab” 
OR  
“TNF.alpha”  
OR  
“hTNF.alpha”  
OR  
“anti-TNF-
alpha”  
OR  
“anti-
TNF.alpha” 
“AbbVie”  
OR  
“Abbott”145  
OR  
“BASF”146 
178 
Enbrel®147 
“etanercept” 
OR  
“tumor necrosis 
factor receptor" 
OR  
“TNF receptor” 
OR  
“TNFR:Fc”  
“Amgen”  
OR  
“Immunex” 
OR 
“Roche” 
OR 
“Hoffmann-
LaRoche”  
77 
 
144. Approved by the FDA and marketed by AbbVie since 2002, Humira® (AbbVie’s brand name 
for adalimumab) is a monoclonal antibody for “the treatment of rheumatoid arthritis and other chronic 
debilitating diseases mediated by tumor necrosis factor.” Adalimumab, DRUGBANK, 
https://www.drugbank.ca/drugs/DB00051#reference-A39984 (last visited Jun. 28, 2019); see Philip J. 
Mease, Adalimumab in the Treatment of Arthritis, 3 THERAPEUTICS & CLINICAL RISK MGMT. 133, 
133–35 (2007). It is subcutaneously administered and available in a prefilled syringe form and in a 
convenient self-administrable pen form. See generally, Alan Kivitz & Oscar G. Segurado, 
HUMIRA®Pen: A Novel Autoinjection Device for Subcutaneous Injection of the Fully Human 
Monoclonal Antibody Adalimumab, 4 EXPERT REV. MED. DEVICES 109, 109–16 (2007). Humira binds 
with high specificity to tumor necrosis factor-alpha, or TNF-alpha, thereby inhibiting the interaction of 
TNF-alpha with p55 and p75 cell surface TNF receptors. Mease, supra. “TNF is a potent osteogenic 
cytokine and the central mediator of inflammation and joint destruction underlying RA [(rheumatoid 
arthritis)], PsA [(psoriatic arthritis)], and AS [(ankylosing spondylitis)] pathology.” Id. By blocking 
TNF interaction, Humira® alleviates cartilage and bone destruction in patients. See id. 
145. AbbVie is a spin-off from Abbott Laboratories. See Abbott Laboratories, Abbott Laboratories 
Completes Separation of Research-Based Pharmaceuticals Business, BIOSPACE (Jan. 2, 2013), 
https://www.biospace.com/. 
146. The reason to include “BASF” in the search query is that “Humira (D2E7, adalimumab) was 
originally developed through a joint venture between Cambridge Antibody Technology and BASF in 
the UK. . . . In 2000, Abbott acquired the pharmaceutical segment of the German chemical company, 
BASF, for $6.9bn.” Humira: The Highs and Lows of the World’s Best-Selling Drug, PHARM. TECH. 
(Sep. 5, 2018), https://www.pharmaceutical-technology.com/features/humira-abbvie-drug/. 
147. Marketed by Amgen since 1998, Enbrel® (brand name for etanercept) is a “[f]usion protein 
made up of 2 soluble TNF receptor molecule (TNFRII) fused with the Fc fragment from human IgG1.” 
Mease, supra note 144. Similar to Humira®, Enbrel®, also targets TNF-alpha and thereby inhibits 
following cascades to inflammation. See id. Enbrel® “is indicated for the treatment of moderately to 
severely active rheumatoid arthritis in adults and chronic moderate to severe plaque psoriasis in adults.” 
Etanercept, DRUGBANK, https://www.drugbank.ca/drugs/DB00005 (last visited Jun. 28, 2019). 
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OR  
“TNFR”  
OR  
“Hoffman-
LaRoche”148 
Rituxan®149 
“anti-CD 20” 
 OR  
“anti-CD20”  
OR  
“rituximab” 
 “Genentech” 
OR 
“Biogen” 
 OR  
“IDEC” 
 OR 
“Roche”  
OR   
“Hoffmann-
LaRoche” 
OR  
“Hoffman-
LaRoche”150 
69 
 
 
148. The reason to include “Amgen”, “Immunex”, and “Hoffman-La Roche” in the search query 
is that there exist patents covering Enbrel® that were originally assigned to these entities. See Enbrel® 
(etanercept) Patent Issued, AMGEN (Nov. 22, 2011), 
http://investors.amgen.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=61656&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=1633115 (“The patent 
[(referring to U.S. Patent No. 8,063,182)] is owned by Hoffman-La Roche Inc . . . and exclusively 
licensed to Amgen. Immunex Corporation (acquired by Amgen in 2002) originally licensed this patent 
application from Roche in 1999, and in 2004, Amgen paid Roche a one-time payment and obtained an 
exclusive, fully paid-up license to the application which issued today as the '182 patent. The patent 
describes and claims the fusion protein that is etanercept. . . .”). 
Notice that slight variations of the company name “Roche” were used in the search query. The 
reason is that the company name is often misspelled, even by those in the industry. See, e.g., id. 
(misspelling Hoffmann-La Roche as Hoffman-La Roche). The company name is “Hoffmann-La Roche” 
with two “n”s. See Our History, ROCHE, https://www.roche.com/about/history.htm (last visited Jun. 28, 
2019) (“The founder of Roche, Fritz Hoffmann-La Roche, was a pioneering entrepreneur who was 
convinced that the future belonged to branded pharmaceutical products.” (emphasis added)). 
149. Approved in 1997 and marketed by Roche and Biogen, Rituxan® is a chimeric monoclonal 
antibody and is directed against CD-20 antigens. Jason J. Emer & Claire Wolinsky, Rituximab: A 
Review of Dermatological Applications, 2 J. CLINICAL AESTHETIC DERMATOLOGY 29, 29 (2009). CD-
20 is believed to play a crucial role in the regulation of cell-cycle initiation and differentiation of the B-
cell lineage. See id. By binding to CD-20, Rituxan® mediates the lysis of B-cells through mechanisms 
including complement dependent cytotoxicity (CDC) and antibody dependent cell-mediated 
cytotoxicity (ADCC). Rituximab, DRUGBANK, https://www.drugbank.ca/drugs/DB00073#reference-
A40017 (last visited Jun. 28, 2019). The indications of Rituxan® include Non–Hodgkin’s Lymphoma 
(NHL), chronic lymphocytic leukemia (CLL), rheumatoid arthritis (RA),  etc. Id.  
150. Rituxan® is marketed by Biogen and Roche in the U.S. Genentech Inc. was acquired by 
Roche in 2009. See Andrew Pollack, Roche Agrees to Buy Genentech for $46.8 Billion, N. Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 12, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/13/business/worldbusiness/13drugs.html. Idec 
Pharmaceuticals was bought by Biogen in 2003 See Andrew Pollack, Idec to Merge With Biogen in $6.8 
Billion Deal, N. Y. TIMES (Jun. 24, 2003), https://www.nytimes.com/2003/06/24/business/idec-to-
merge-with-biogen-in-6.8-billion-deal.html. The company name variations were used for the same 
reasons as described in note 148. 
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b. Inclusion of patents from other references 
For the purpose of ensuring the comprehensiveness of the patents 
retrieved, the search results were cross-examined with patents listed in 
complaints151 against the biosimilar manufacturers. Patents that are listed 
on the complaints but not retrieved by the search query are added and 
included in the study.152 
c. Exclusion of irrelevant patents 
To increase the accuracy of the search results, patents that merely 
claim the drugs or proteins as dispensable second therapeutic elements in 
dependent claims; or that claim the drugs or proteins targeting antigens or 
targets irrelevant to the drug of interest are excluded. 
The collective set of patents covering each biologic after the inclusion 
of patents from other references and the exclusion of irrelevant patents are 
the final set of patents that undergoes analysis. 
3. Patent retrieval of the top three best-selling small-molecule drugs in 
the U.S. based on 2018 sales revenue 
a. In general 
The searches were conducted on April 30th, 2019 using the USPTO 
patent database and European Molecular Biology Laboratory (hereinafter, 
EMBL)’s SureChEMBLbeta Open Patent Data153 (hereinafter, 
SureChEMBL). For the patent searches in the USPTO patent database, 
drug names, fragmented structure names (IUPAC structure names), names 
of the marketing company and its related subsidiary firm names were used 
as keywords in the search query. In order to identify appropriate keywords, 
information from the Drugs@FDA and DrugBank were also used as 
references. For the structural searches in SureChEMBL, search results were 
limited to exact structures of the drug molecules. Table 4 lists the search 
 
151. To find the relevant complaints a case search was done using the PORTAL database built by 
Unified Patents Inc. PORTAL, https://portal.unifiedpatents.com/ (last visited Jun. 28, 2019). The brand 
drug company names were used as the search query in the plaintiff field. The patents-in-suit in the 
retrieved cases were cross-examined with the patent search results. 
152. The reason why some of the patents listed on the complaints are not retrievable by the search 
query is because these patents claim fundamental manufacturing aspects of the drug or protein. 
Therefore, these patents do not necessarily claim specific manufacturing process of a particular drug or 
protein and are consequently out of the scope of the search queries that target specific antibodies or 
proteins.  
153. SURECHEMBLBETA OPEN PATENT DATA, https://www.surechembl.org/search/ (last visited 
Jun. 28, 2019). 
INTO THE WOODS: A BIOLOGIC PATENT THICKET ANALYSIS  12/24/2019  10:56 AM 
118 CHICAGO-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. Vol 19:1 
 
queries used to search for patents covering each small-molecule drug and 
the count of hits the search queries have retrieved. 
Expected patent expiration dates were also retrieved through Google 
Patent Search results or calculated using the USPTO patent term calculator 
based on data retrieved from USPTO Public PAIR. 
 
Table 4: Small-Molecule Patent Search Query and Count of Hits 
Brand 
Drug Name 
Database 
Search Query in 
“Title”, 
“Abstract” and 
“Claims” 
Search 
Query in 
“Assignee 
Name” 
Number 
of 
Hits154 
Revlimid®155 
USPTO patent 
database 
“3- 4-amino-1-
oxo-1,3-dihydro-
isoindol-2-yl -
piperidine-2,6-
dione”  
OR  
“4-amino-1-oxo-
1,3 dihydro-
isoindol-2-yl” 
OR 
“lenalidomide” 
OR  
“3- (4-amino-1-
oxo-1,3-
dihydroisoindol-
Celgene 59 
 
154. The patents retrieved by these search queries are only considered preliminary results. Cross-
examination of the preliminary results with other databases to include missed patents and to exclude 
irrelevant patents will further yield a final result for analysis.  
155. Revlimid®, Celgene’s brand name for lenalidomide, is an analogue of thalidomide and an 
immunomodulator. Martin Paspe Cruz, Lenalidomide (Revlimid) A Thalidomide Analogue in 
Combination With Dexamethasone For the Treatment of All Patients With Multiple Myeloma, 41 
PHARM & THERAPEUTICS 308, 308 (2016). The drug has multiple mechanisms of actions, including the 
stimulation of the immune system, the inhibition of cell proliferation in tumor cells and the attenuation 
of angiogenesis. Mechanism of Action, REVLIMID.COM, https://www.revlimid.com/mm-hcp/mechanism-
of-action/?mm-self-id=yes (last visited Jun. 28, 2019). It has been demonstrated, in vitro, that 
lenalidomide inhibits the expression of cyclooxygenase-2 (COX-2). Lenalidomide, DRUGBANK, 
https://www.drugbank.ca/drugs/DB00480 (last visited Jun. 28, 2019). Revlimid® was approved by the 
FDA in 2005 and was “initially intended as a treatment for multiple myeloma . . . but has also shown 
efficacy in the hematological disorders known as the myelodysplastic syndromes.” Id. 
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2-yl) -piperidine-
2,6-dione”156 
SureChEMBL 
 
61 
Eliquis®157 
USPTO 
patent database 
“apixaban”  
OR  
(4-
methoxyphenyl$ 
AND 
“pyrazolo[3,4-
c]pyridine-3-
carboxamide”)158 
“Bristol-
Myers 
Squibb” 
OR 
“Pfizer” 159 
8 
SureChEMBL 
 
3 
Lyrica®160 USPTO “pregabalin” “Warner- 46 
 
156. The IUPAC name of Revlimid® is “3-(4-amino-1-oxo-2,3-dihydro-1H-isoindol-2-
yl)piperidine-2,6-dione.” DRUGBANK, supra note 155.  To retrieve more comprehensive results, search 
queries included fragmentations of its IUPAC name. 
157. Eliquis® is the brand name of the drug apixaban. It is an “oral direct factor Xa inhibitor that 
has been shown to reduce the risk of stroke in a similar population in comparison with aspirin.” 
Christopher B. Granger et al., Apixaban Versus Warfarin in Patients with Atrial Fibrillation, 365 NEW 
ENG. J. OF MED 981, 981 (2011). Eliquis® was approved in 2012 and is indicated for “reducing the risk 
of stroke and systemic embolism in patients who have nonvalvular atrial fibrillation, prophylaxis of 
deep vein thrombosis (DVT) leading to pulmonary embolism (PE) . . .  and treatment of DVT and PE to 
reduce the risk of recurrence.” Apixaban, DRUGBANK, https://www.drugbank.ca/drugs/DB06605 (last 
visited Jun. 28, 2019). Besides factor Xa, Eliquis® also inhibits prothrominase. Id. Collectively, they 
prevent the formation of thrombus. Id. 
158. The IUPAC name of Eliquis® is “1-(4-methoxyphenyl)-7-oxo-6-[4-(2-oxopiperidin-1-
yl)phenyl]-1H,4H,5H,6H,7H-pyrazolo[3,4-c]pyridine-3-carboxamide.” DRUGBANK, supra note 157. 
The fragmentated name was used in the search query to obtain more comprehensive results. Cf. supra 
note 156. The symbol “$” refers to a wildcard when searching in the USPTO patent database. See Help 
on the Advanced Search Page, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., PAT. FULL TEXT & IMAGE DATABASE, 
http://patft.uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/help/helpadv.htm (last visited Jun. 28, 2019). 
159. To ensure that all possible patents were retrieved by the marketing companies, both BMS and 
Pfizer were used in the search query. See BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB, supra note 136; see also PFIZER, 
INC., supra note 136. 
160. Lyrica® is the brand name for the drug pregabalin. It is approved for “adjunctive therapy of 
partial seizures in adults, and has [also] been approved for the treatment of pain from diabetic 
neuropathy or post-herpetic neuralgia in adults.” Charles P. Taylor, Pharmacology and Mechanism of 
Action of Pregabalin: The Calcium Channel 2— (alpha2—delta) Subunit as a Target for Antiepileptic 
Drug Discovery, 73 EPILEPSY RES. 137, 137 (2007). There are currently “two types” of Lyrica®: the 
original version— Lyrica®— and its extended release, Lyrica CR®. The primary patents of the original 
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patent database OR 
“5-
methylhexanoic”
161 
Lambert” 
OR 
“Pfizer”162 
SureChEMBL 
 
46 
 
 
b. Inclusion of patents from other references 
In order to increase the comprehensiveness of the study, the search 
results were cross-examined with patents listed in complaints163 against the 
drug’s generic manufacturers. Furthermore, the search results were also 
cross-examined with the patents listed in the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration’s “Orange Book: Approved Drug Products with 
Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations” (hereinafter, “the Orange Book”)164 
and the patent information listed in DrugBank. 
 
version of Lyrica® (U.S. Patent No. 6,001,876 and U.S. Patent No. 6,197,819) were set to expire at the 
end of 2018 just when the FDA approved Lyrica CR®. Lyrica CR® is covered by patents whose 
expiration dates extend beyond 2026. (According to the Orange Book, the latest patent expiration date 
for Lyrica CR® is set on Nov. 2, 2026, but with pediatric extension, the expiration of the exclusivity is 
set to be on May 2, 2027). Lyrica CR® is merely an extended release of Lyrica® (and even covered by 
the same patent, see, e.g., U.S. Patent No. RE41,920 (which is listed as a patent covering both Lyrica® 
and Lyrica CR®)). The difference between the drugs is that instead of taking the pill three times a day 
(Lyrica®), patients could take the pill once a day (Lyrica CR®). See Eric Sagonowsky, With a Year Left 
Before Generics Hit, Pfizer Nabs FDA Approval for New-and-Improved Lyrica, FIERCEPHARMA (Oct. 
12, 2017), https://www.fiercepharma.com/. For patent comparison purposes, the article will treat the 
drug collectively as Lyrica®. 
161. The IUPAC name of Lyrica® is “(3S)-3-(aminomethyl)-5-methylhexanoic acid.” 
Pregabalin, DRUGBANK, https://www.drugbank.ca/drugs/DB00230 (last visited Jun. 28, 2019). The 
fragmentated name was used in the search query to obtain more comprehensive results. Cf. DRUGBANK, 
supra note 156.   
162. Some of Lyrica®’s patents originally belonged to Warner-Lambert Company (See, e.g., U.S. 
Patent No. 8,945,620; U.S. Patent No. 10,022,447), which was acquired by Pfizer in 2000. Laura M. 
Holson & Melody Petersen, Pfizer and Warner-Lambert Are Seen in Merger Deal, N. Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 
2000), https://www.nytimes.com/. 
163. To find the relevant complaints, a case search was done using the PORTAL database built by 
UNIFIED PATENTS INC. PORTAL, https://portal.unifiedpatents.com/ (last visited Jun. 28, 2019). The 
brand drug company names were used as the search query in the plaintiff field. The patents-in-suit in 
the retrieved cases were cross-examined with the patent search results. 
164. U.S. Food & Drug Admin.’s Orange Book: Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic 
Equivalence Evaluations, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob/index.cfm (last visited Jun. 28, 2019). 
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c. Exclusion of irrelevant patents 
Patents that merely claim the drug as a dispensable second therapeutic 
element in dependent claims or that claim other molecule structures are 
excluded. 
The collective set of patents covering each small-molecule drug after 
the inclusion of patents from other references and the exclusion of 
irrelevant patents are the final set of patents that undergoes analysis. 
4. Core patents and peripheral patents 
In order to better present and analyze the alleged patent thickets, this 
article proposes a patent portfolio visualization for the selected drugs. The 
reasoning behind this visualization can be explained in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Hypothetical Drug Patent Portfolio Visualization 
Source: own construction. 
 
Figure 1 is a hypothetical example of the proposed patent portfolio 
visualization. The circles represent patent scopes of each patent that 
potentially covers the drug; while the different shades of gray filling the 
circles symbolize different types of patents.165 The dashed circular area is 
the necessary scope of patent “clearance” for generic or biosimilar entry. 
That is, the patents (circles) within in the dashed circular area are those that 
will block generic or biosimilar entry and are thus considered the “core 
patents.” The other drug patents outside of the dashed circular area only 
 
165. The types of patents include composition of matter patents, treatments patents, 
manufacturing patents, formulation patents and etc. See Figure 2, infra. 
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cover aspects of the drug that are not necessarily essential for generic or 
biosimilar entry. These patents are thus termed “peripheral patents.” 
Examples of “peripheral patents” include patents that cover drug 
polymorphs that are not approved by the FDA,166 devices that assist in 
administering the drug,167 or methods to monitor or predict the treatment of 
the drug.168 
In this study, patents that are listed in complaints, on patent lists 
provided by brand biologic companies and on the Orange Book are 
considered “core patents;” since these patents are those that were asserted 
or that the brand name drug companies believe a claim of patent 
infringement could reasonably be asserted against biosimilar and generic 
drug applicants.169 The remaining retrieved patents are considered 
“peripheral patents.” 
 
166. E.g., U.S. Patent No. 8,143,286; U.S. Patent No. 8,431,598; U.S. Patent No. 8,822,499; U.S. 
Patent No. 9,353,080; U.S. Patent No. 9,365,538; U.S. Patent No. 9,371,309 (all claiming polymorphs 
of the small-molecule drug Revlimid®). 
167. E.g., U.S. Patent No. 8,992,476; U.S. Patent No. 9,408,973; U.S. Patent No. 9,943,649 (all 
claiming an autoinjection device for the administration of Humira®). 
168. E.g., U.S. Patent No. 8,728,730 (relating to a method for the prediction of the treatment of 
rituximab). 
169. See 42 U.S.C. §262 (I)(3)(A)(i) (stating that the reference product sponsor should provide a 
patent list “for which the reference product sponsor believes a claim of patent infringement could 
reasonably be asserted by the reference product sponsor, or by a patent owner that has granted an 
exclusive license to the reference product sponsor with respect to the reference product, if a person not 
licensed by the reference product sponsor engaged in the making, using, offering to sell, selling, or 
importing into the United States of the biological product that is the subject of the subsection (k) [or the 
biosimilar] application” (emphasis added)); for small-molecule drugs, see 21 C.F.R § 314.53 (b)(1) 
(stating that the patents on the Orange Book should be patents that “claims the drug or a method of 
using the drug that is the subject of the NDA or amendment or supplement to it and with respect to 
which a claim of patent infringement could reasonably be asserted if a person not licensed by the owner 
of the patent engaged in the manufacture, use, or sale of the drug product.”).  
Note that due to the very nature of them being bio-”similars,” the scope of patent clearance 
required for entry may vary slightly for different biosimilars. For example, the number of patents the 
reference sponsor identified as potentially infringed is different for different biosimilar companies.  Cf. 
Complaint at 13-15, AbbVie Inc. et al v. Amgen Inc. et al, CIVIL No. 1:16-cv-00666-UNA (D. Del. 
Aug. 2, 2017) (No. 1) (MaxVal Litigation Databank) (alleging possible infringement of 61 patents) with 
AbbVie v. BI complaint, at 15-19 (wherein same plaintiff alleging possible infringement of 74 patents 
against a different biosimilar manufacturer.). Therefore, compared to small-molecule generics, the 
patent scope clearance required for entry (or what patents constitute as the core patents) for each 
individual biosimilar claiming the same reference product may vary at a larger extent. See, e.g., Steve 
Brachmann, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Pfizer File ANDA Lawsuits Against Makers of Generic Eliquis, 
IPWATCHDOG (Apr. 12, 2017), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/ (stating that BMS and Pfizer “fired off a 
series of nine lawsuits to prevent generic versions of Eliquis,” wherein the patents asserted were the two 
patents: U.S. Patent No. 6,967,208 and U.S. Patent No. 9,326,945.). 
However, despite the possible differences in what are considered as the “core patents for each 
biosimilar claiming the same reference product,” this article treats the union of these patents (including 
all patents on exchange lists and complaints) as the “core patents” of the biologic henceforth in this 
article. Reasons that lead to this decision as well as what limitations the decision will entail are 
discussed as follows.  
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The visualization of Figure 1 is further simplified to the form in 
Figure 2. The center pie chart in Figure 2 presents the number of core 
patents categorized by the drug aspects they cover—including the 
composition of matter170; the treatments, the formulations, the 
manufactures and other aspects171; while the outer donut chart shows the 
number of peripheral patents using the same categorization. The form 
illustrated in Figure 2 not only helps in the spatial visualization of “core 
patents” and “peripheral patents” but also provides the patent counts and 
statistical numbers about the patent portfolio. Moreover, the size of each 
improved patent portfolio visualization is proportional to the number of 
patents in the portfolio. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
First, it is practically impossible to know what patents will be considered as the “core patents” for 
the following potential biosimilar applicants. The next potential applicant may have found a way to 
circumvent patents that are “core patents of previous biosimilars” or fail to circumvent patents that are 
“peripheral patents of previous biosimilars.” Thus, for the sake of providing historic references for 
future possible biosimilars, treating the “core patents for previous biosimilars” collectively as the “core 
patents” of the biologic would be reasonable. Readers may argue why this article does not treat the 
intersection of “the core patents for previous biosimilars” as the “core patents” of the biologic and treat 
the remainder as “peripheral patents.” Based on the fact that at least one previous biosimilar applicant is 
unable or is believed by the reference sponsor to be unable to circumvent these patents (the union of 
patents listed on all complaints and exchange lists) indicates that theoretically, at least significantly 
more effort is required to design around these patents in comparison to those not listed, even if these 
patents may not claim the most essential part of the biologic. Admittedly, whether a patent truly does 
block biosimilar or generic entry warrants litigation scrutiny. Thus, strictly speaking, patents listed on 
complaints, in exchange lists or in the Orange Book do not necessarily mean that they are the “core 
patents” that will result in injunction and thus block market entry. Nevertheless, since they are listed, 
biosimilars and generics do need to at least put in the effort to prove non-infringement or patent 
invalidity. Thus, broadly speaking, listed patents do hinder the entry of biosimilars and generics. 
Another issue worth emphasizing is that not all “core patents” cover the reference biologic 
product itself. This is because there can be patents that would block biosimilar entry by claiming a 
variation of the reference biologic product. In other words, these patents claim the “wiggling room” 
between biosimilars and biologic reference products. See, e.g., BI’s Motion for Leave to File Amended 
Answers at 64 (arguing that “[a]t least nine of AbbVie’s formulation patents in the Humira® patent 
scheme do not contain even one claim that reflects the Humira® formulation. U.S. Patent No. 8,795,670, 
9,327,032, and U.S. Patent No. 9,732,152, for example, sought to patent the use of, but the Humira® 
formulation does not include histidine . . . . “) This issue will also be further discussed in the causes of 
patent thickets and the solutions thereof. See infra Part VI.B.2. & VII.A.2. 
170. For example, patents that cover the drug itself or its sequence variations or polymorphs. 
171. The “other aspects” category includes patents covering the diagnostic methods, the devices 
or patents having multiple aspects in one patent. 
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Figure 2. Improved Hypothetical Drug Patent Portfolio Visualization 
Source: own construction. 
D. Research Results: Patent Portfolio Visualization 
The patent portfolio visualizations of each selected drug are presented 
(Figures 3-8). As explained in previous sections, the outer donut chart 
represents the peripheral patents while the center pie chart represents the 
core patents. The relative sizes of the patent portfolio visualizations are 
proportional to the number of patents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INTO THE WOODS: A BIOLOGIC PATENT THICKET ANALYSIS 12/24/2019  10:56 AM 
2019 Into the Woods: A Biologic Patent Thicket Analysis 125 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Humira®’s Patent Portfolio Visualization 
Source: own construction based on patents retrieved in empirical study. 
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Figure 4: Enbrel®’s Patent Portfolio Visualization 
Source: own construction based on patents retrieved in empirical study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Rituxan®’s Patent Portfolio Visualization 
Source: own construction based on patents retrieved in empirical study. 
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Figure 6: Revlimid®’s Patent Portfolio Visualization 
Source: own construction based on patents retrieved in empirical study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Eliquis®’s Patent Portfolio Visualization 
Source: own construction based on patents retrieved in empirical study. 
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Figure 8: Lyrica®’s Patent Portfolio Visualization 
Source: own construction based on patents retrieved in empirical study. 
E. Preliminary Assessment of Patent Thickets 
Previous literature has proposed different methods to measure the 
extent of patent thickets.172 However, most of this literature bases their 
measurements on the definition that the patents in the alleged patent thicket 
belong to multiple firms.173 This definition does not apply to the case of 
this study as the commercialization of biosimilars and generics mainly 
depend on the elimination of patents belonging to one or two branded drug 
companies. Moreover, these studies have only focused on patent thickets 
that cover a specific technological area instead of a single particular 
product.174 Therefore, the methods employed by these studies are not 
suitable for the present study. In this Section, this article explores two 
 
172. BRONWYN H. HALL ET AL., A STUDY OF PATENT THICKETS 37-40 (2013), 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/.  
173. For example, the social network analysis by using the concept of triplets— “defined as a 
group of three firms in which each firm has critical prior art limiting claims on recent patent 
applications of each of the other two firms.”—; or “measuring the hold-up potential existing in different 
parts of the patent system using qualitative techniques such as interviews.” See id.  
174. See, e.g., id. at 41-42 (showing the triplet counts of different technological areas); see 
generally, Gave Clarkson & David DeKorte, The Problem of Patent Thickets in Convergent 
Technologies, 1093 ANNALS N. Y. ACAD. SCI. 180, 180–200 (2006) (focusing on nanotechnology); see 
generally, Charlie Schmidt, Negotiating the RNAi Patent Thicket, 25 NATURE BIOTECH. 273, 273-75 
(2007) (focusing on RNAi).  
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preliminary ways to assess drug patent thickets. Based on the two proposed 
preliminary assessment methods, results show that biologics have a greater 
tendency to form patent thickets. 
1. Patent counts as criterion 
a. Reasoning of analysis 
As discussed previously, a patent thicket is a dense web of 
overlapping patents covering a single technology that a company must 
plow through to actually commercialize the technology.175 If we define the 
“single technology” the alleged patent thicket covers as the product, or in 
the case of this article, the drug, the patents that cover the drug would then 
be considered the alleged patent thicket. Thus, it would be reasonable to 
use the counts of these patents to assess Type I Patent Thickets.176 The idea 
behind this assessment is that whenever a competitor hopes to fully 
commercialize the drug, it would then have to hack through, for example, 
the patents that cover the active drug ingredient itself, the different steps of 
manufacture, the treatments of uses, or even combinational uses and 
devices to administrate the drug, all of which overlapping the “single 
technology”— the “drug.” Table 5 lists the final patent counts177 of the 
selected drugs. 
b. Analysis of patent counts 
According to the results illustrated in Table 5, the drugs having the top 
two highest total patent counts are both biologics—Humira® and Rituxan®, 
each having 154 patents and 80 patents, respectively. Ranking third is the 
 
175. See, supra Part III.A. 
176. Of course, “patent counts” is not the only method to assess the extent of patent thickets. 
Patent claims, which represent a certain embodiment of the invention could also be used as a criterion. 
However, the number of claims may not necessarily indicate how much “effort” or how “dense” the 
patent thicket is as the scope of different patent claims are hardly the same. It is possible that the scope 
of a single claim in one patent is many times broader or harder to handle for alleged infringers than 
another claim in another patent.  
Another anticipated question would be: why not use the patent scope of each patent claim as 
criterion for patent thicket assessment? The problem with this proposal is the comparative scope size for 
different patent claims is not easily defined. The determination process would also be very subjective 
and arguably less persuasive. Thus, to avoid complication, this study will conveniently use patent 
counts as the main criterion for assessment. Although patents arguably have the same “scope” problem 
as patent claims have, a patent covers only one single invention. 35 U.S.C. § 101. Therefore, using 
patent counts as assessment criterion at least provides the picture of how many “patented inventions” 
the competitor-to-be needs to hack through to commercialize the technology.  
177. The preliminary results were cross-examined with different databases to yield a final result 
for analysis. See, supra notes 143 and 154.  
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small-molecule drug Revlimid®, with 74 patents in total. The remaining 
drugs all have fewer than 50 granted U.S. patents. 
However, from an entry barrier perspective and assuming that 
potential competitors are not planning to commercialize every aspect of the 
drug, the core patents are what primarily prevents entry. By comparing core 
patent counts, the ranking is somewhat similar to the ranking of total patent 
counts. 
Comparing both total and core patent counts of the top-selling drugs 
show that biologics accumulate more patents compared to small-molecule 
drugs—indicating the presence of patent thickets. 
 
Table 5: Core and Peripheral Patent Counts of the Selected Drugs 
Source: own calculation based on patents retrieved in empirical study. 
 
Brand Drug 
Name 
Drug 
Category 
Core Patent 
Count 
Peripheral 
Patent 
Count 
Total 
Humira® Biologic 93 61 154 
Rituxan® Biologic 43 37 80 
Revlimid® Small-
Molecule 
29 44 73 
Enbrel® Biologic 6 41 47 
Lyrica® Small-
Molecule 
7 38 45 
Eliquis® Small-
Molecule 
3 3 6 
 
2. Adding time into perspective 
a. Reasoning of analysis 
Patents expire.178 Thus, if we only consider patent counts, we may 
overstate the number of patents generic or biosimilar need to clear for 
market entry. It is possible that the patents covering the drug span across a 
 
178. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (a)(2). 
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long period and do not amount to a patent thicket at any given time point. 
In this radical scenario, the competitors would not need to hack through as 
many patents as in a scenario where the same number of patents is 
concentrated in a shorter time period.179 Thus, to incorporate the “time” 
element in the patent thicket assessment, figures that present active core 
and peripheral patent counts at different time points are constructed for 
each drug.180 
In order to calculate the number of active patents at a given timepoint 
for a selected drug, the number of core or peripheral patents applied before 
such given time point is subtracted with the anticipated number of core or 
peripheral patents expired before such given time point.181 For graphing 
purposes, the time points are all set at the end of each year.182 The counts of 
active patents between each time points are treated continuously to form an 
“active patent count-time plot.”183 
 
179. In the scenario which multiple patents covering a single drug span across a long period might 
amount to patent evergreen. See, supra Part III.A. 
180. See Figures 9-14, infra. 
181. To effectively compare the 20-year patent term, the patent application date and the expiration 
date are used to define the term of an “active patent” even though patents rights are received only once 
they are issued. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (a)(2). But see id. § 154 (d) (provisional rights).   
182. Due to using each “year” rather each “day” as the individual time points, patents applied or 
expired at different times within the same year are all viewed as applied or expired at the end of such 
given year. Therefore, the plot does not account for the change of active patent counts within a single 
year. 
183. Though providing a more accurate picture of patent thickets compared to patent counts, using 
active patent count vs. time plots for assessment is based on some assumptions that may require some 
attention. These assumptions, depending on whether they are true or on their extent, may overestimate 
or underestimate the degree of patent thickets.  
First, the study is limited to granted patents and does not include patent applications. This 
limitation may result in an underestimation of the extent of patent thickets; since if the pending patent 
applications are subsequently granted, the newly granted patents may add to the alleged patent thicket. 
Another possibility of underestimation is the calculation of patent expiration dates. Although patent 
terms are calculated 20 years from the earliest claimed non-provisional domestic application, it is 
possible that the applicant is not claiming benefit from the first filed application. In this case, the 
expiration date may actually be later than anticipated. This may contribute to a longer year span and 
result in a larger extent of patent term overlap. Furthermore, there can still be patents that potentially 
cover the drug but are not included in the study due to them not being retrievable through the present 
research method. 
When it comes to the possibilities of overstating the extent of patent thickets, the assessment treats 
all patents as equally valid, important and indispensable of the drug. This assumption does not consider 
the fact that patents applied later are possibly easier to design around. If this were true, the patent 
thicket may not be as hard to hack through as it seems. Moreover, the assessment also treats the alleged 
patent thicket as being intact. It does not take into the account that patents may expire earlier due to 
failing to pay maintenance fees or be deemed unenforceable or unpatentable by courts or the Patent 
Trial and Appeal Board (hereinafter, PTAB). 
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b. Active patent count vs. time plot of selected drugs 
The active patent count-time plots of the selected drugs are presented 
herein (Figures 9-14). For comparison reasons, the maximum value of the 
y-axis (patent counts) is set at 160. The year of U.S. market entry of each 
selected drug is labeled on the figures as well. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 9: Humira®’s Active Patent Counts by Year 
Source: own construction based on patents retrieved in empirical study. 
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Figure 10: Enbrel®’s Active Patent Counts by Year 
Source: own construction based on patents retrieved in empirical study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Rituxan®’s Active Patent Counts by Year 
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Source: own construction based on patents retrieved in empirical study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12: Revlimid®’s Active Patent Counts by Year 
Source: own construction based on patents retrieved in empirical study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13: Eliquis®’s Active Patent Counts by Year 
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Source: own construction based on patents retrieved in empirical study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14: Lyrica®’s Active Patent Counts by Year 
Source: own construction based on patents retrieved in empirical study. 
c. Analysis of active patent count vs. time plots 
For comparison and analytical reasons, the core active patent counts 
from Figures 9-14 are consolidated to construct Figure 15. Similarly, the 
total active patent counts from Figures 9-14 are consolidated to construct 
Figure 16. The peak and average active patent counts of the selected drugs 
are presented in Table 6. 
According to the results from Table 6, we can unquestionably see that 
Humira® ranks first place in all indicators, including peak and average 
counts of both core and total patents. Coming in second in the indicators of 
core patents is Rituxan®, making the top two drugs in core patent counts 
both biologics. Noticeably, Rituxan® and the small-molecule drug 
Revlimid® have very similar peak and average patent counts when 
considering both core and peripheral patents. 
In sum, the results show that when considering both core and 
peripheral patents, it can arguably be said that the difference in average 
counts is less significant. However, if we consider only core patents, 
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patents that necessarily block market entry, biosimilar companies do face 
more barriers compared to small-molecular drug companies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15: Active Core Patent Count vs. Time Plots of Selected Drugs 
Source: own construction based on patents retrieved in empirical study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16: Active Total Patent Count vs. Time Plots of Selected Drugs 
Source: own construction based on patents retrieved in empirical study. 
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Table 6: Peak and Average Active Patent Counts of the Selected Drugs 
Source: own calculation based on patents retrieved in empirical study. 
 
Brand 
Drug 
Name 
Drug 
Category 
Peak 
(Core)184  
Average 
(Core) 
Peak 
(Total)185  
Average 
(Total) 
Humira® Biologic 92 31.28 144 56.95 
Rituxan® Biologic 42 17.73 71 27.40 
Revlimid® Small-
Molecule 
29 13.12 70 27.85 
Enbrel® Biologic 6 3.20 41 19.33 
Lyrica® Small-
Molecule 
5 3.59 36 19.59 
Eliquis® Small-
Molecule 
3 1.85 6 3.23 
 
IV. TYPE I AND TYPE II BIOLOGIC PATENT THICKETS 
Though having provided the patent counts of the alleged patent 
thickets, the study does not stop here. This article further argues that there 
are actually two types of patent thickets. As the following Parts entail, the 
two types of patent thickets are different in nature; the impacts they 
contribute; and the causes that give rise to them. It would be irresponsible 
to treat and assess the two types of patent thickets as one. 
In this Part, Section A first discusses the reasoning behind the 
differentiation of the two types of patent thickets. Next, Section B proposes 
a method to identify the two types of patent thickets. Armed with the 
method, this article then assesses the extent of the two types of patent 
thickets in the core patents of the selected drugs. 
 
184. Peak Active Core Patent Count. 
185. Peak Total Active Patent Count. 
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A. A Tale of Two Thickets 
Diving deeper into the alleged patent thickets reveals two types of 
relationships between different patents— (1) patents that are more 
inventive, and less prone to double patenting (patents that do not have 
claims overlapping with other patents); and (2) those that are less inventive 
and more prone to double patenting (patents that do have overlapping 
claims with other patents). This article argues that the accumulation of 
these two types of patents form the proposed two types of patent thickets. 
Figure 17-19 are visualizations that may assist in understanding the 
proposed concept. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17: Visualization of A Hypothetical Type I Patent Thicket 
Source: own construction. 
 
Figure 17 is a visualization of a hypothetical Type I Patent Thicket. 
The white circles each represent the scope of a patent that covers a 
particular aspect of the drug. Notice that the patent scopes do not overlap 
and are less prone to double patenting. When the number of these patents 
increase, they collectively amount to a Type I Patent Thicket (hereinafter, 
these patents will be termed as “Type I Patents” in this article). Figure 18 is 
a visualization of hypothetical Type II Patent Thickets. The shaded circles 
represent the scope of patents that cover a specific aspect of the drug. The 
patent scopes overlap in different degrees but do not overlap completely 
and are prone to double patenting. Each overlapping “cluster” amounts to 
one Type II Patent Thicket (hereinafter, these patents will be termed as 
“Type II Patents” in this article). 
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Figure 18: Visualization of Hypothetical Type II Patent Thickets 
Source: own construction. 
 
It would be unsurprising if a drug patent portfolio is a combination of 
the two types of patent thickets. Figure 19 illustrates this possibility. To 
avoid complication and interplay during Type I Patent Thicket assessments, 
each cluster of Type II patents is treated as “one single count.” That is, 
when assessing the number of patents in the alleged Type I Patent Thicket 
in Figure 19, the three Type II Patent Thickets are counted as three single 
counts, making a total of “nine patent counts” in the Type I Patent Thicket. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 19: Visualization of Hypothetical Type I and Type II Patent 
Thickets 
Source: own construction. 
B. Assessment of Type I and Type II Patent Thickets 
Having the reasoning in mind, this Section first explains how the 
proposed method—using terminal disclaimers—can differentiate Type I 
Patents and Type II Patents. With the method at hand, this article moves on 
to assess the existence and extent of Type I and Type II Patent Thickets in 
the selected drugs. The results of the assessment are presented and 
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discussed in Sub-Section 2. Finally, to dive deeper into an alleged Type II 
Patent Thicket, a direct comparative analysis of one of Humira‘s alleged 
Type II Patent Thickets is conducted in Sub-Section 3. 
1. Reasoning of assessment methodology 
To determine whether Type I or Type II Patent Thickets exist, we 
must first be able to distinguish Type I Patents from Type II Patents. The 
most direct way to evaluate is, of course, to directly compare the patent 
claims with one another. This method is, however, tedious and time-
consuming. 
Fortunately, USPTO can help. Under statute, the act of obtaining 
overlapping patents is termed as “double patenting.”186 There are two types 
of double patenting, (1) statutory-type double patenting; and (2) non-
statutory-type double patenting (or obviousness-type double patenting).187 
The former is not allowed under 35 U.S.C. § 101, while the latter is 
allowed if the patents belong to the same patent owner and if such patent 
owner files a terminal disclaimer.188 
Based on this fact, the article proposes that terminal disclaimers can 
indirectly identify whether patents overlap or whether they are prone to 
double patenting.189 Patents that are tied together by terminal disclaimers 
can be deemed as Type II Patents; whereas the remaining patents can be 
considered as Type I Patents. Having this in mind, we would be able to 
further assess the extent of Type I and Type II Patent Thickets by counting 
the number of Type I and Type II Patents. 
 
186. MPEP  § 804 (9th ed. Rev. Jan. 2018). 
187. JOHN GLADSTONE MILLS III ET AL., PATENT LAW BASICS § 15:50 (last updated Nov. 2018) 
(stating that “[t]hus, there are two types of double patenting: (1) the “same invention” type, which is 
based on 35 U.S.C.A. § 101; and (2) the “obviousness” type, which is judicially created doctrine based 
on public policy rather than statute and which is primarily intended to prevent prolongation of 
monopoly by prohibiting claims in a second patent not patentably distinguishing from claims in a first 
patent,”). 
188. See id.; see also Sarkisian v. Winn-Proof Corp., 697 F.2d 1313, 1324–25 (9th Cir. 1983); 
Application of Vogel, 422 F.2d 438, 441–42 (C.C.P.A.1970). 
189. However, it must be stressed that the filing of a terminal disclaimer serves the only purpose 
to overcome an obviousness-type double patenting rejection and does not indicate that the patent owner 
admits to double patenting. See Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Smith, 959 F.2d 936, 941 (Fed. Cir. 1992) 
(stating that “the filing of a terminal disclaimer simply serves the statutory function of removing the 
rejection of double patenting,” and does not mean that the patent applicant admitted to obviousness type 
double patenting). Nonetheless, this article argues that receiving an obviousness-type double patenting 
rejection or having the concern to receive such rejection so as to file a terminal disclaimer would be a 
more than sufficient indicator that the patents have overlapping claims or are prone to double patenting. 
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2. Results of Type I and Type II Patent Thicket assessment 
By using the proposed method, this article assesses the core patents of 
the selected drugs.190 The results are shown and discussed as follows. 
Table 7 illustrates the counts of Type I and Type II Patents. Moreover, 
to present the distribution of the Type II Patents, the table also shows the 
number of Type II Patent Thickets and the average patent count in each 
Type II Patent Thicket. 
 
Table 7: Counts of Type I and Type II Patents 
Source: own calculation based on patents retrieved in empirical study. 
Brand 
Drug 
Name 
Drug 
Category 
Count of 
Type I 
Patents191 
Count of 
Type II 
Patents 
Type II 
Patent 
Thicket 
Count192 
Average 
Type II 
Patent 
Count in 
Type II 
Thicket 
Rituxan® Biologic 38 9 1 3.00 
Humira® Biologic 27 78 9 8.00 
Revlimid® Small-
Molecule 
10 26 5 4.40 
Lyrica® Small-
Molecule 
5 3 0 N/A 
Enbrel® Biologic 4 2 0 N/A 
Eliquis® Small-
Molecule 
3 0 0 N/A 
 
According to the results in Table 7, it is interesting to see that the top-
selling biologics have more Type I Patents compared to small-molecule 
drugs. However, when it comes to Type II Patents, this trend is less 
significant. We can interpret this result as top-selling biologics are more 
capable of forming Type I Patent Thickets compared to small-molecules; 
 
190. The reason this article has chosen core patents to analyze is because that these are the patents 
that would most likely hinder biosimilar and small-molecule generic entry. 
191. Type II Patent clusters are included and treated as one count. 
192. Number of Type II Patent Thickets, wherein Type II Patent Thickets are defined as Type II 
Patent clusters that have three or more patents. 
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whereas top-selling biologics and small-molecules are both arguably 
capable of forming Type II Patent Thickets. Figure 20 may help to illustrate 
this. The x-axis is the count of Type I Patents, whereas the y-axis is the 
count of Type II Patents. Drugs situated on the right of the graph, such as 
Rituxan, are more likely to form Type I Patent Thickets; and those located 
on the top of the graph, such as Revlimid, are more likely to form Type II 
Patent Thickets. Noticeably, Humira is situated on the right-top corner. 
This indicates that Humira‘s substantial number of patents not only are 
prone to overlap but also cover a great variety of aspects of the biologic. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 20: Type I Patent vs. Type II Patent Count Plot 
Source: own construction based on patents retrieved in empirical study. 
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3. A Type II Patent Thicket example: direct claim comparison of 
AbbVie’s Humira® patents 
As mentioned previously, the most straightforward way to identify 
Type II Patents is to dive directly into the patents and compare their claims. 
Since Humira® has the most tangled Type II Patent Thicket, this article 
selects Humira® as an example to conduct a claim comparison analysis. 
The Type II Patent Thicket having the most patents is the “‘583 Type 
II Patent Thicket.” All of the patents in this Type II Patent Thicket are tied 
to U.S. Patent No. 8,216,583. There is a total of 21 patents in the ‘583 Type 
II Patent Thicket and all of these patents are core patents covering the 
formulation of Humira®. Interestingly, all of these patents also belong to 
the same patent family193 and are all chained continuations of the same U.S. 
patent application.194 They also have nearly identical patent specifications. 
For illustration purposes, only claim one of the patents are compared. 
The components of claim one of each patent are broken down and 
compared with one another. Table 8 illustrates the comparison. 
 
Table 8: Comparison of Claims 1 in the ‘583 Type II Patent Thicket 
Source: own construction based on patents retrieved in empirical 
study. 
 
U.S.  
Patent 
No. 
Components of the Formulation of Claim 1 
Human 
TNF- 
antibody195 
Polyol Polysorbate Buffer 
System 
Other 
 
193. Family ID No. 31714885. 
194. U.S. Patent Application No. 10/222,140 (filed Aug. 16, 2002) (now abandoned). 
195. The original wording of all claims 1 of the patents in the ‘583 Type II Patent Thicket are 
identical or highly similar to “a human IgG1 anti-human Tumor Necrosis Factor alpha (TNF.alpha.) 
antibody, or an antigen-binding portion thereof . . .wherein the antibody comprises the light chain 
variable region and the heavy chain variable region of D2E7;” compare  claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 
8,216,583, with claims 1 of U.S. Patent No.s 8,802,100, 8,802,101  8,802,102, 8,911,741, 8,916,157, 
8,916,158, 8,932,591, 8,940,305, 9,114,166, 9,220,781, 9,272,041, 9,272,042, 9,289,497, 9,295,725, 
9,302,011, 9,327,032, 9,732,152, 9,738,714, 9,750,808, 9,950,066; but for comparison purposes, these 
wordings are shortened as shown in Table 8. D2E7 is the original antibody name of adalimumab. See 
Joachim Kempeni, Preliminary Results of Early Clinical Trials with the Fully Human Anti-TNFá 
Monoclonal Antibody D2E7, 58 ANNALS OF THE RHEUMATIC DISEASES I70, I70-I72 (1999). 
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8,216,583 20-150 
mg/ml196 
V197 X198 With  
Citrate or 
phosphate, 
With 
surfactant 
8,802,100 45-150 
mg/ml 
V 0.1-
10mg/ml 
at pH  
4.5-7.0 
N/A 
8,802,101 45-105 
mg/ml 
V 0.1-
10mg/ml 
With  
acetate,  
at pH  
4.5-7.0 
N/A 
8,802,102 45-105 
mg/ml 
V 0.1-
10mg/ml 
With  
succinate, 
at pH  
4.5-7.0 
N/A 
8,911,741 20-150 
mg/ml 
V V With  
phosphate,  
at pH  
4.0-8.0 
N/A 
8,916,157 20-150 
mg/ml 
X X at pH  
4.0-8.0 
With  
tonicity 
agent; 
surfactant 
8,916,158 20-150 
mg/ml 
V X at pH  
4.0-8.0 
With 
surfactant 
 
196. Instead of directly claiming the antibody D2E7, the patent claimed both the complementary 
determining region (hereinafter, CDR) amino acid sequences of D2E7’s heavy and light chain and its 
possible amino acid substitution points. See U.S Patent No. 8,216,583, claim 2 (issued Jul. 10, 2012) 
(stating that the antibody claimed in claim 1 is D2E7). 
197. “V” indicates that the patent limited its claim 1 to include the component. If the patent also 
specified other particular characteristics of the component, the characteristic will be listed in the table or 
in the footnote. See, e.g., id. 
198. “X” indicates that the patent did not limit its claim 1 to include such component. 
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8,932,591 35-115 
mg/ml199 
V X With  
citrate and 
phosphate 
With 
surfactant 
8,940,305 20-150 
mg/ml 
V X With  
gluconate, 
at pH 
4.0-8.0 
With 
surfactant 
9,114,166 50 mg/ml X X V N/A 
9,220,781 50 mg/ml V V With  
organic 
acid, at  
pH 4-8 
N/A 
9,272,041 50 mg/ml V V With  
acetate,  
at pH 4-8 
N/A 
9,272,042 50 mg/ml V V With  
phosphate, 
at pH 4-8 
N/A 
9,289,497 50 mg/ml V V With  
gluconate, 
at pH 4-8 
N/A 
9,295,725 50 mg/ml V V With  
succinate, 
at pH 4-8 
N/A 
9,302,011 50 
mg/ml200 
V V With  
organic 
acid, at  
pH 4-8 
N/A 
 
199. The claim did not directly claim the antibody D2E7 but claimed its CDRs. See U.S. Patent 
No. 8,932,591, claim 6 (issued Jan. 13, 2015) (stating that the antibody in claim 1 is D2E7). 
200. Instead of claiming the antibody D2E7, the patent claimed the amino acid sequence of its 
heavy and light chain variable region.  
INTO THE WOODS: A BIOLOGIC PATENT THICKET ANALYSIS  12/24/2019  10:56 AM 
146 CHICAGO-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. Vol 19:1 
 
9,327,032 50 mg/ml V V With  
histidine, 
at pH 4-8 
N/A 
9,732,152 45-105 
mg/ml 
V V With  
histidine, 
at pH 4-8 
N/A 
9,738,714 45-105 
mg/ml 
V V With  
succinate, 
at pH 4-8 
N/A 
9,750,808 45-105 
mg/ml 
X X V N/A 
9,950,066 50 mg/ml V V With  
citrate and 
phosphate 
N/A 
 
Comparison results in Table 8 show that most of the patents in the 
‘583 Type II Patent Thicket all claim nearly identical components: a certain 
concentration of human TNF- antibody, a polyol, a polysorbate, and a 
buffer system. The claim scopes of the patent members significantly 
overlap with one another. For instance, the scope of U.S. Patent No. 
8,802,100 (hereinafter “the ‘100 patent”) overlaps with both U.S. Patents 
No. 8,802,101 (hereinafter, “the ‘101 patent”) and 8,802,102 (“the ‘102 
patent”). The only difference is that the ‘100 patent does not further specify 
its buffer system, while the ‘101 patent and ‘102 patent do by limiting the 
buffer systems to include acetate and succinate respectively.201 
Another example of overlapping claims in the ‘885 patent family 
would be U.S. Patents No. 9,220,781 (hereinafter “the ‘781 patent”) and 
9,302,011 (hereinafter “the ‘011 patent”) wherein the only difference in 
claim 1 of the two patents is the “wording” of the claim describing the 
antibody. The ‘781 patent directly specifies the antibody to be D2E7 while 
 
201. See, supra Table 8; U.S. Patent No. 8,802,100, claim 1 (issued Aug. 12, 2014); U.S. Patent 
No. 8,802,101, claim 1 (issued Aug. 12, 2014); and U.S. Patent No. 8,802,102, claim 1 (issued Aug. 12, 
2014). 
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the ‘011 patent defines the antibody’s heavy and light chain variable region 
to comprise a particular amino acid sequence.202 However, comparing the 
claimed heavy and light chain sequences in claim 1 of the ‘011 with that of 
adalimumab (antibody DE27), showed that the sequences were actually 
identical.203 There are also other overlapping claims in the ‘583 Type II 
Patent Thicket.204 However, due to the extensiveness, the remaining claim 
overlaps  in the ‘583 Type II Patent Thicket are not discussed further in this 
article. The chunky overlapping claims among the ‘583 Type II Patent 
Thicket also serves as an example that patents tied with terminal 
disclaimers do tend to double patent and have overlapping claims. 
V. IMPACTS OF BIOLOGIC PATENT THICKETS: STACKING, 
STRETCHING AND SKYROCKETING 
This article has so far demonstrated that patents cover biologics 
compared to small-molecule drugs. This indicates that among the top-
selling drugs, biologics are more likely to form patent thickets in 
comparison to small-molecule drugs.205 Dissecting the patent thickets into 
two types reveal while top-selling biologics and small-molecule drugs are 
both capable of large numbers of patents that amount to Type II Patent 
Thickets, only top-selling biologics are capable of forming high numbers 
Type I Patents that may accumulate to Type I Patent Thickets.206 
This Part moves on to discuss the impacts of patent thickets and 
argues that patent thickets ultimately contribute to the skyrocketing of drug 
prices. The argument sets forth in three sections. Section A first discusses 
how patent thickets stack obstacles to patent challenges and force 
contenders into settlements. Next, Section B explains that patent thickets 
have the capacity to evergreen and that this capacity is contributed by the 
existence of Type I Patent Thickets by showing the correlation between the 
 
202. U.S. Patent No. 9,220,781, claim 1 (issued Dec. 29, 2015) (“wherein the antibody is D2E7”); 
U.S. Patent No. 9,302,011, claim 1 (issued Apr. 5, 2016) (“wherein the antibody comprises a light 
chain variable region comprising the amino acid sequence of SEQ ID NO:1 and a heavy chain variable 
region comprising the amino acid sequence of SEQ ID NO: 2 [emphasis added]”). 
203. Comparing the sequence listed in SEQ ID NO:1 and SEQ ID NO:2 of the ‘110 patent with 
adalimumab’s light and heavy chain sequence respectively (DRUG BANK, supra note 144) using blastp 
suite-2sequences from BLAST® (Blastp Suite-2sequences, U.S. NAT’L LIBRARY OF MED., NAT’L CTR. 
OF BIOTECH. INFO., https://blast.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/) both yielded results of 100% identity with an E-
value of 3e-80 for the former and 2e-89 for the latter. Id. 
204. For example, the scope of claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 9,732,152 covers entirely that of U.S. 
Patent No. 9,327,032; the ‘781 patent also covers the claim 1 of U.S. Patents No. 9,272,041, 9,272,042, 
9,289,497, 9,295,725. 
205. See, supra Part III.E. 
206. See, supra Part IV.B. 
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number of Type I core patents with the total year span of the collective 
patent term. Finally, as Section C entails, the capability to force contenders 
into settlements and to evergreen may lead to the skyrocketing of drug 
prices. 
A. Type I and Type II Patent Thickets: Stacking Obstacles 
One of the most eminent capabilities of patent thickets is the leverage 
it provides for patent owners to force generics or biosimilar manufacturers 
into settlements. For example, AbbVie has brought all biosimilars 
referencing its blockbuster, Humira®, to the table, arguably with its patent 
thicket.207 As of May 2019, all of the eight adalimumab (Humira®’s drug 
name) biosimilar companies, have given up to challenge its patent estate 
and agreed to enter into settlements with AbbVie.208 Previously, Boehringer 
Ingelheim was the only biosimilar company willing to put up a fight for 
AbbVie’s Humira® U.S. market by raising an “unclean hands” defense, 
claiming that AbbVie formed a patent thicket to stake out competition.209 
However, after a two-year struggle, Boehringer Ingelheim eventually 
joined the settlement with its peers in the U.S. for an entry date set in 
2023.210 
There are at least three reasons patent thickets provide patent owners 
this power. First, the sheer number of patents increase the unpredictability 
of the litigation. The risk of losing litigation rises as the number of patents-
in-suit increases.211 According to a spokesperson from Boehringer 
Ingelheim, though the company wanted to make Cyltezo® [(Boehringer 
Ingelheim’s adalimumab biosimilar)] available earlier, due to “the 
unpredictability of litigation, the substantial costs of what would have been 
a long and complicated legal process and ongoing distraction to our 
business,” the challenger surrendered and concluded that entering into the 
settlement was the best solution.”212 The patent owner would merely need 
one single patent claim to be valid and infringed to receive injunction 
relief, whereas generics or biosimilars would need to overcome layers of 
 
207. Andrew Dunn, With Boehringer Settlement, AbbVie Completes Humira Sweep, BIOPHARMA 
DIVE (May 14, 2019), https://www.biopharmadive.com/news/. 
208. See id.  
209. See id. 
210. Ben Hargreaves, Boehringer Ends ‘Distraction’ by Signing Humira Biosimilar Deal, 
BIOPHARMA-REPORTER (May 15, 2019), https://www.biopharma-reporter.com/. 
211. Zachary Silbersher, What Are the Lessons from Boehringer’s Settlement with AbbVie Over 
Its Humira Biosimilar?, MARKMAN ADVISORS (May 17, 2019), https://www.markmanadvisors.com/. 
212. See id. 
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obstacles to achieve the freedom to operate.213 This fact makes patent 
thickets able to provide “multiple patent lives” for the drug it covers and 
results in a lower possibility for the drug’s biosimilar or generic to be 
commercialized. 
This result is an analogous manifestation of the “tragedy of the anti-
commons” concept.214 The concept describes the underuse of a certain 
resource due to there being too many owners holding the rights to exclude 
others from utilizing such resource.215 In the present case, all core patents 
have the ability to block the commercialization of the drug. Similarly, as 
the number of core patents increases, the possibility to commercialize the 
drug decreases. 
Second, consider costs. Even if we attempt to use the widely appraised 
lower-cost method—Inter Partes Reviews (hereinafter, IPR)— to cut down 
patent thickets, it would still be very costly, if at all feasible.216 At its peak, 
AbbVie has 92 active core patents covering Humira®.217 According to 
studies conducted by Patent Progress218  and RPX219, the median cost to 
reach an IPR final decision is $250,000. Thus, it would at least cost nearly 
$23 million to invalidate all the patents, assuming that they are all, for 
some reason, unpatentable—which is often not the case. 
Third, think of time. The mere existence of patent thickets increases 
the patent monitoring costs and time for biosimilars and small-molecule 
generics. Not to mention the time needed to spend on dissecting the patents 
if they are asserted.220 If the plaintiffs provide an entry date earlier than a 
 
213. See BI’s Amended Answers at 63-64 (citing the words from AbbVie on “how events were 
playing out in adalimumab biosimilar litigation as it had desired: [‘W]hile the number [of patents found 
infringed] may not be 61, I’m confident the number is not going to be 0[.’]”). 
214. Cf. Michael M. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from 
Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 622-88 (1998). 
215. See id. 
216. See Josh Landau, Inter Partes Review: Five Years, over $2 Billion Saved, PAT. PROGRESS 
(Sep. 14, 2017), https://www.patentprogress.org/2017/09/14/inter-partes-review-saves-over-2-billion/ 
(stating that IPRs save more cost compared to litigations). 
217. See, supra Part III.E.1.c. at Table 6. 
218.  See Landau, supra note 216.   
219. IPRs: Balancing Effectiveness vs. Cost, RPX (2016), 
https://www.rpxcorp.com/intelligence/blog/iprs-balancing-effectiveness-vs-cost/. 
220.  There is, however, precedent where courts limit the number of patents or patent claims the 
patentee can assert in a lawsuit for the sake of judicial economy. In re Katz Interactive Call Processing 
Patent Litigation, 639 F.3d 1303, 1310-13 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Nonetheless, even if courts do impose a 
limit on the number of claims or patents assert-able, the process of determining how many and which 
patents and patent claims would still take up a great amount of time and cost if patent thickets are 
present. 
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court decision, biosimilar and small-molecule generic companies might just 
take the offer.221 
Besides forcing settlements, patent thickets may also provide more 
bargaining power when negotiating settlement options with contenders.222 
For instance, Amgen’s Amgevita® is granted the earliest U.S. entry date for 
adalimumab biosimilars, which is set to be at the end of January 2023;223 as 
opposed to the European market where adalimumab biosimilar entry was 
already allowed in late 2018.224 According to the Initiative for Medicines, 
Access & Knowledge (I-MAK)’s study, there are three times more patent 
applications covering Humira® in the U.S. compared to that in Europe.225 
B. Type I Patent Thickets: Stretching Across Longer Year Spans 
Patent Thickets also have the capacity to evergreen. The Type I 
Patents contribute to this capacity as these patents would be able to have 
different expiration dates. Patents in Type II Patent Thickets, however, are 
tied to the same expiration date by terminal disclaimers and would thus not 
be able to evergreen. 
Nevertheless, it should be stressed that patent evergreening should not 
be considered as a necessary consequence of Type I Patent Thickets. One 
can, on the same day, apply a considerable number of patents that cover 
different aspects of a drug. In this scenario, the patent owner allegedly 
formed a Type I Patent Thicket with no sign of evergreening. However, 
this usually never happens as ideas usually pop up gradually over time.226 
Indeed, a strong positive correlation exists between the count of Type I 
 
221. See BI’s Amended Answers at 63-64 (citing the words from AbbVie on “how events were 
playing out in adalimumab biosimilar litigation as it had desired: [‘]if Amgen were to prevail on every 
claim under 61 patents, the earliest we’ll be getting a decision is 2020. . . we would then have obviously 
the right to appeal. That would take a year. And so that gets you into mid-2021. What’s nice is you 
begin to see that the time line is starting to merge on that 2022 anyways, and I think the market is 
beginning to recognize that as well[.’]” 
222. See INITIATIVE FOR MED., ACCESS & KNOWLEDGE, OVERPATENTED, OVERPRICED: SPECIAL 
HUMIRA EDITION (2018), http://www.i-mak.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/i-
mak.humira.report.final_.0917.pdf. (stating that “[s]ince AbbVie has not been as successful in 
aggressively evergreening its patent protection for Humira in Europe, competitors will enter the market 
considerably earlier in October 2018.”). 
223. See Dunn, supra note 207. 
224. Andrew Dunn, 5th Humira Biosimilar Approved in EU as Market Entry Nears, BIOPHARMA 
DIVE (Sep. 20, 2018), https://www.biopharmadive.com/news/humira-biosimilar-europe-fifth-mylan-
abbvie/532840/. 
225. See INITIATIVE FOR MED., ACCESS & KNOWLEDGE, supra note 222. 
226. It is, however, considered an inequitable conduct to deliberately deceive the USPTO 
regarding material information or purposely conceal information upon applying a patent. See generally, 
MILLS ET AL., supra note 187 § 15:50. 
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core patents and the length of accumulated core patent term (correlation 
coefficient = 0.95),227 indicating that the more likely a Type I Patent 
Thicket is present, the longer the accumulated patent term is; and arguably 
the more likely evergreening exists. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 21: Core Patent Count vs. Patent Term Plot 
Source: own construction based on patents retrieved in empirical study 
C. Ultimate Impact: Skyrocketing Drug Prices 
The idea behind establishing an expedited approval pathway for drugs 
is to lower drug prices through increased competition. 228 This theory 
 
227. See, infra Figure 21. 
228. See, supra Part II.C; see Andrew W. Mulcahy et al., Biosimilar Cost Savings in the United 
States: Initial Experience and Future Potential, 7 RAND HEALTH Q. 3 para. 9 (2018) (stating that “the 
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functions in practice if the generics and biosimilars reach the market. 
FDA’s study on small-molecule drugs revealed that the market entry of 
generics is associated with the decrease of drug prices, with the second 
generic entry impacting prices the most.229 As for top-selling biologics, 
Manova et. al’s study showed that in the 18 European countries studied, the 
manufacturer price for etanercept and rituximab biosimilars are 36% and 
39%  lower than brand drug biologics respectively; whereas retail prices 
are each 11%, and 86% lower than their reference products.230 With 
cheaper alternatives in the market, reference product sponsors respond by 
decreasing their drug prices, as can be seen from Abbvie offering an 80% 
discount for its blocbuster drug Humira® in face of biosimilar competition 
in the European tender markets.231 The phenomenon of competition driving 
down drug prices can also be seen in the U.S.232 
However, when it comes to the drugs that have monopoly status or are 
covered with a higher number of patents (arguably patent thickets), the 
pricing trends are not as friendly.233 With biosimilars still off the U.S. 
market, Humira® prices in the U.S. have hiked by 6.2% in 2019 compared 
to the previous year despite inflation rate only around 2.4%.234 In fact, the 
drug has increased more than 50% in price over the years, which can 
arguably be termed as “skyrocketing” considering the inflation rate was 
merely 11.6% in the same period.235 The main reason these drug companies 
 
rationale for a biosimilar approval pathway is to promote competition among manufacturers to lower 
prices and potentially increase access to medications.”) 
229. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 102. 
230. Manoela Manova, Comparative Price Analysis of Biological Products for Treatment of 
Rheumatoid Arthritis, 9 FRONT PHARMCOLOGY art. 1070 at 5. 
231. Eric Sagonowsky, AbbVie Offers Up 80% Humira Discount in EU Tender Market to Hold 
Off Biosimilars: Report, FIERCE PHARMA (Oct. 31, 2018), https://www.fiercepharma.com/. 
232. See, e.g., Ben Hirschler & Michael Shields, Novartis Launches First U.S. ‘Biosimilar’ Drug 
at 15 Percent Discount, REUTERS (Sep. 3, 2015), https://www.reuters.com/; Biosimilars Launched in 
the US at a Significant Discount, GENERICS AND BIOSIMILARS INITIATIVE, http://www.gabionline.net/ 
(last updated Dec. 14, 2018) (stating that “US-based biosimilars specialist Coherus BioSciences 
(Coherus). . .would price its pegfilgrastim biosimilar at a 33% discount to the originator, Amgen’s 
neutropenia treatment Neulasta (pegfilgrastim) and that “US pharma giant Pfizer. . .began shipping 
Retacrit to wholesalers at a list price of US$11.03 per 1,000 units/mL, a 57% discount compared to 
Amgen’s Procrit and a 33.5% discount compared to Johnson & Johnson’s Epogen.”). 
233. See INITIATIVE FOR MED., ACCESS & KNOWLEDGE, supra note 42 (stating the drug price 
hikes of the drugs.) 
234. See Michael Erman, Drug Companies Greet 2019 with U.S. Price Hikes, REUTERS, 
https://www.reuters.com/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2019) (stating that the price of Humira® increased by 
6.2%); United States: Inflation rate from 1990 to 2018 (2019), STATISTA, 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/191077/inflation-rate-in-the-usa-since-1990/ (last visited Nov. 9, 
2019) (stating that the inflation rate in the U.S. is 2.4%).  
235. See INITIATIVE FOR MED., ACCESS & KNOWLEDGE, supra note 227 (indicating that the price 
hike was 144% from 2012 to 2018), and since the drug increase was 6.2%, adding this to calculation 
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have the luxury to raise prices is arguably due to their market exclusivity.236  
The existence of patent thickets not only potentially prolongs this market 
exclusivity but also ensures that this market exclusivity would not be easily 
challenged. 
Moreover, the absolute value of price elasticity of demand for 
pharmaceutical drugs is lower than 1, ranging from -0.18 to -0.60,237 
meaning that the need for drugs hardly depends on its price. This value 
makes sense because without these drugs, the patients’ health conditions 
would be jeopardized. If drug prices are raised, the patients would rarely 
have the choice to opt out. However, not all patients can afford the 
increasing price of drugs.238 The patent thicket problem is not only a matter 
of entry barriers for competitors but also a public health issue. There is 
arguably nothing wrong with a system that rewards innovation, but gaming 
the system to reap additional benefits at the expense of people’s health and 
lives would be less intolerable. 
VI. CAUSES OF BIOLOGIC PATENT THICKETS 
After covering the undesirable effects of patent thickets, this article 
moves on to discuss why patent thickets exist. Patent thickets are 
artificially established; thus, to answer the question— “why patent thickets 
exist,”—we need to consider the following two questions: (1) what 
motivates companies to file so many patents and (2) what allows 
companies to obtain these patents. 
Section A covers the first question and shows that compared to small-
molecule drugs, biologic companies have additional motives to file many 
patents. Section B answers the second question by pointing out that 
biologics have more patent subject matters that can be filed compared to 
small-molecule drugs. Section B also argues that while both small-
molecule drugs and biologics are capable of forming Type II Patent 
Thickets, only biologics are capable of forming Type I Patent Thickets. 
Therefore, it is unsurprising that biologics are more likely to form patent 
thickets with larger extents. 
 
yields an increase of 52.9% in the price of Humira. See Erman, supra note 239.. By multiplying the 
inflation rates from 2012 to 2018 yields an 11.6% increase. See STATISTA, supra note 239. 
236. See Hakim, supra note 9. 
237. Emily Cox, Why Financial Incentives Aren’t Enough to Move the Needle on Compliance, 2 
AM. HEALTH & DRUG BENEFITS 12, 12 (2009). 
238. See generally, Sarah Jane Tribble, Why the U.S. Remains the World’s Most Expensive Market 
For ‘Biologic’ Drugs, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Dec. 20, 2018), https://khn.org/news/u-s-market-for-
biologic-drugs-is-most-expensive-in-the-world/. 
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A. Motivations to File (Many) Patents 
Superficially, the first question— what motivates companies to file so 
many patents — can be easily answered: companies know that the effects 
of patent thickets can assist them in establishing a prolonged and hardly 
challengeable market exclusivity wherein they can set drug prices at will 
and retrieve the benefits on their investments.239 However, besides then 
merely slapping the “greedy” label on drug companies—which admittedly 
may be true in some cases240—there is more to the story. 
Another perspective is that companies may not be able to retrieve 
sufficient return on investment with a lower drug price as the current 
exclusivity term statute and regulations provide and guarantee. Although 
the statute provides a patent exclusivity term of 20 years,241 due to the 
complicated approval process and the need to accumulate enough data to 
receive FDA approval, companies are unable to commercialize their 
investments in the first eight years of the patent term.242 We can also see 
this phenomenon from the empirical study of this article: the average year 
between the first patent application to the market launch is approximately 
8.17 years.243 Even though the statute provides patent restoration, the 
additional five-year-term244 may still not be enough for drug companies. 
Although for different purposes,245 the five-year246 and twelve-year247 data 
 
239. See generally, infra Part V. 
240. Jeffrey Young & Shane Ferro, Pharma Bro Emails Reveal Just How Greedy Drug 
Companies Can Be, HUFFPOST (Feb. 2, 2016, last updated Dec. 19, 2016), 
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/martin-shkreli-pharma-bro-drug-
prices_n_56b0fac5e4b0655877f75453. 
241. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (1952). 
242. Matthew Herper, Solving the Drug Patent Problem, FORBES (May 2, 2002), 
https://www.forbes.com/2002/05/02/0502patents.html#3be4544317bc (stating that “patents protect 
drugs from copycat versions for 20 years after the drug is invented. This is a bitter pill for 
pharmaceutical companies because it can take eight years or more after invention to accumulate enough 
data to get a drug past the U.S. Food and Drug Administration.”). 
243. The year span between each drug is as follows: Humira®: 6 years; Enbrel®: 3 years; 
Rituxan®: 9 years; Revlimid®: 9 years; Eliquis®: 13 years, Lyrica®: 9 years. See, supra Part III.E.2.b., at 
Figures 9-14. 
244. 35 U.S.C. § 156(g)(6); see Small Business Assistance: Frequently Asked Questions on the 
Patent Term Restoration Program, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/ (last visited Jun. 
14, 2019). 
245. It should be stressed that the purpose of data exclusivity is not to extend patent rights, nor to 
bar follow-on drugs to enter the market, but to prevent these follow-on drug companies from free-riding 
on the data collections of the new drug company; thus, necessitating them to either wait for the data 
exclusivity period to expire or to invest and conduct their own clinical trials for data collection. See 
KRISTINA M. LYBECKER, THE BIOLOGICS REVOLUTION IN THE PRODUCTION OF DRUGS 18 (2016), 
https://www.fraserinstitute.org/. 
246. 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(E)(ii). 
247. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(A). 
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exclusivity provided by the Hatch-Waxman Act and the BPCIA would also 
not adequately compensate the loss of patent term since they usually 
overlap with each other.248 
Even if the patent term is compensated, it is possible that the 20-year 
patent term itself is still insufficient. The development times for new 
protein therapeutics have increased steadily since the early 1980s, thus 
potentially increasing the erosion of patent term protection.249 
Most importantly, patents can be challenged. If the only one patent is 
invalidated, the company would lose all of its exclusivity and have no 
guarantee that it will retrieve its investments. Filing more patents ensures 
that the exclusivity period is guaranteed and unchallenged. 
Apart from the aforementioned motivations, biologic manufacturers 
have two additional incentives to file more patents compared to small-
molecule companies. These incentives may be part of the reason why 
biologic patent thickets are more likely to be formed. 
First, the time for new biologics to break-even and recoup their earlier 
investments is estimated to be about 12.9 to 16.2 years.250 These extended 
break-even lifetimes mean that the 12-year data exclusivity period would 
be over just when, or even before, companies are about to gain profits. 
Thus, it would only be natural for companies to have the motivation to 
retrieve and maximize those gains after the 12-year data exclusivity period 
by filing a lot of patents. 
Second, the unique nature of biologics may also have a role to play. 
Due to their larger size, and the existence of similar effective variants, it is 
relatively easier to invent around an existing biologic patent than that of 
small-molecule drugs.251 As such, in terms of comprehensively covering 
the drug, the scope of a single biologic patent is relatively smaller 
compared to that of a small-molecule patent.252 Given this, biologic 
companies have even more motivation to file more patents to compensate 
 
248. See Henry Grabowski et al., Data Exclusivity for Biologics, 10 NATURE REVIEWS DRUG 
DISCOVERY 15, 16 (2011) (“[i]n those instances [where biologic patents provide relatively strong 
protection with significant patent life remaining at approval], the data exclusivity period has only a 
minimal effect on market exclusivity times and thus on health-care costs. The 12-year data exclusivity 
period therefore operates mainly as an ‘insurance policy’ to encourage innovation when patent 
protection is limited.”). 
249. Henry Grabowski, Follow-on Biologics: Data Exclusivity and the Balance Between 
Innovation and Competition, 7 NATURE REV. DRUG DISCOVERY 479, 482 (2008). But this does not 
mean that it will erode the patent term, as companies may choose to file patents at later stages of the 
development. 
250. See id. at 486. 
251. LYBECKER, see supra note 245, at 17. 
252. See id. 
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for the fact that one or a few patents will not fully cover the different 
“aspects” of the biologic. 
B. What Makes Biologic Patent Thickets (More) Possible? 
Being motivated is one thing while being able to realize it is another. 
The existence of patent thickets also requires the possibility for it to form, 
not merely the motivations of the companies. When discussing the 
possibility for patent thickets to form, this Section refrains from covering 
the capability of companies as these internal factors are less relevant to the 
solution to patent thickets. Instead, this article focuses on what external 
factors allow the formation of patent thickets. 
Sub-Section 1 first discusses how the ability to overcome obvious-
type double patenting by filing terminal disclaimers allows the formation of 
Type II Patent Thickets and why it is a problem. Since this is an issue for 
patents in general, both small-molecule drugs and biologics are capable of 
forming Type II Patent Thickets. However, when it comes to Type I Patent 
Thickets, Sub-Section 2 argues that it is the nature of biologics and 
biosimilars that allows its formation. 
1. Type II Patent Thickets: Exploitation of Terminal Disclaimers 
Many articles have proposed numerous insightful discussions 
regarding possible reasons why the USPTO grants more patents than the 
statutes allow, including the heavy workload for examiners;253 the agency’s 
funding structure;254 and examiners’ characteristics or competencies.255 
 
253. See Saurabh Vishnubhakat & Arti K. Rai, When Biopharma Meets Software: Bioinformatics 
at the Patent Office, 29 HARV. J. L. & TECH 205, 211 (2015) (stating that “The USPTO operates under a 
number of institutional constraints that might cause application of existing patent law standards to be 
too lax. Perhaps most notably, examiners have a very limited amount of time to examine patents”); see 
generally Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Is the Time Allocated to Review Patent 
Applications Inducing Examiners to Grant Invalid Patents?: Evidence from Micro-Level Application 
Data (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res. Working Paper No. 20337, 2014), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w20337 [http://perma.cc/BVC6-FG3R] (finding evidence “demonstrating 
that such promotions [(of individual examiners that carry reductions in examination-time allocations)] 
are associated with reductions in examination scrutiny and increases in granting tendencies, as well as 
evidence that those additional patents being issued on the margin are of below-average quality”); John 
L. King, Patent Examination Procedures and Patent Quality, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED 
ECONOMY 54 (Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003) (concluding that  the examination 
hours and examination actions have remained largely consistent over time despite the increase of 
workload.). 
254. See Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Does Agency Funding Affect 
Decisionmaking?: An Empirical Assessment of the PTO’s Granting Patterns, 66 VAND. L. REV. 67, 69-
71, 84-85, 119 (2013) (stating that patents in categories with more maintenance fee received are more 
likely to be granted and that the agency was biased to allow patents that had higher renewal rates); see 
Arti K. Rai, Growing Pains in the Administrative State: The Patent Office’s Troubled Quest for 
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These factors may indirectly contribute to the formation of patent thickets 
but are not the central cause of the subject at hand. 
The ability to overcome an obvious-type double patenting rejection by 
filing a terminal disclaimer is what allows patents castigated overlapping 
and non-inventive by critics256 (Type II Patents) to exist. By filing multiple 
allegedly overlapping patents all tied with terminal disclaimers, drug 
companies accumulate Type II Patent Thickets. 
The reason to allow obviousness-type double patenting overcome-able 
in the first place is that these patents mostly “involve a modification of or 
improvement upon what an inventor or his assignee has already patented. 
The desire is to be able to bring such improvement inventions within the 
protection of the patent system, at the same time giving an incentive for 
their disclosure.”257 
However, two problems were recognized to arise if obvious-type 
double patenting were to be allowed: (1) patents that do not expire at the 
same time may extend patent terms, and (2) patents owned by different 
parties may give rise to troublesome litigation.258 Thus, in hopes of solving 
the two problems, regulation requires patent owners to file a terminal 
disclaimer claiming that “the patent [(the patent that is deemed as obvious-
type double patenting, or the second patent)] shall expire immediately if it 
ceases to be commonly owned with the other application or patent [(the 
 
Managerial Control, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2051, 2062 (2009) (stating that “the current fee structure also 
sets up an obvious financial incentive for the PTO to grant patents.”). 
255. See Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Examiner Characteristics and Patent Office 
Outcomes, 94 REV. ECON & STAT. 817, 826 (arguing that “more experienced examiners cite less art, 
issue fewer initial rejections, and are more likely to grant patents,” while also excluding the possibility 
“that more senior examiners are more likely to grant could suggest that they can more quickly figure out 
what is patentable in an application” since “[t]he finding that more senior examiners systematically cite 
less prior art reinforces the inference that senior examiners are doing less work, rather than that they are 
merely getting it right more often than junior examiners); see also Shine Tu, Invalidated Patents and 
Associated Patent Examiners, 18 VAN. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 135, 165 (2015) (arguing that the main 
problem of granting invalid patents rise from the ability to find prior art. In particular, “77 percent of 
the prior art references used to invalidate patents were not found by the USPTO. . .[and] in cases where 
the invalidating prior art was a U.S. patent or U.S. patent application, the invalidating references were 
not found by the patent examiner 89 percent of the time.”). 
256. See Kelly Davio, Class Action Lawsuit Filed Against AbbVie and Biosimilar Developers 
Alleges Collusion, THE CTR. FOR BIOSIMILARS (Mar. 19, 2019), 
https://www.centerforbiosimilars.com/news/class-action-lawsuit-filed-against-abbvie-and-biosimilar-
developers-alleges-collusion (reporting that the complaints allege “AbbVie’s patent estate for Humira is 
[‘]designed solely to insulate Humira from any biosimilar competition in the U.S. for years to come,[‘] 
and that the company secured patents, many of them overlapping and noninventive” [emphasis 
added].). 
257. In re Van Ornum, 686 F.2d 937, 948 (C.C.P.A. 1982); see P. J. Federico, Commentary on the 
New Patent Act, 35 USCA p. 49 (1954).   
258. See MILLS, supra note 187. 
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application or patent that was cited as prior art for the obvious-type double 
patenting rejection, or the first patent)]” and that “the second patent 
application disclaims that part of the patent term that would extend beyond 
the expiration of the first patent.”259 
Unfortunately, terminal disclaimers do not solve all the problems that 
obvious-type double patenting has to offer. Terminal disclaimers do not 
require patent applicants to link the validity or enforceability of the latter 
patent to that of the former.260 This means that if the former patent is 
invalid, the latter patents bound to the former by terminal disclaimers are 
not indirectly invalid261 or unenforceable.262 Consequently, one cannot, 
after invalidating one of the many patents linked via terminal disclaimers, 
argue that the other patents linked with said terminal disclaimers are 
“indirectly” invalid.263 Companies may have discovered this point and 
exploited it. The strategy would thus be to file a lot of alleged non-obvious 
 
259.  MILLS, supra note 187; see 37 C.F.R. § 1.321(b); MPEP § 804.02 (9th. Ed. Rev. 8.2017, Jan. 
2018). 
260. See MPEP §1490 at IV (9th. Ed. Rev. 8.2017, Jan. 2018) (stating that “[n]ote the exculpatory 
language in the second paragraph of the sample terminal disclaimer forms, PTO/SB/25. . . [t]hat 
language (referring to the language: “[i]n making the above disclaimer, the owner [does not disclaim 
the terminal part of any patent granted on the instant application that would extend to the expiration 
date of the full statutory term of any patent granted on said reference application,. . . in the event that: 
any such patent: granted on the pending reference application: expires for failure to pay a maintenance 
fee, is held unenforceable, is found invalid by a court of competent jurisdiction, is statutorily disclaimed 
in whole or terminally disclaimed under 37 CFR 1.321. . .or is in any manner terminated prior to the 
expiration of its full statutory term as shortened by any terminal disclaimer filed prior to its grant.]”) is 
permissible.”). 
261. See Ortho Pharm. Corp., 959 F.2d at 941 (stating that “[i]n legal principle, the filing of a 
terminal disclaimer simply serves the statutory function of removing the rejection of double patenting, 
and raises neither presumption nor estoppel on the merits of  the rejection” and does not mean that the 
patent applicant admitted to obviousness type double patenting by filing a terminal disclaimer); see also 
SimpleAir, Inc. v. Google LLC, 884 F.3d 1160, 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (admitting that while “a terminal 
disclaimer is a strong clue that a patent examiner and, by concession, the applicant, thought the claims 
in the continuation lacked a patentable distinction over the parent” but agreeing with precedent that 
“[the] strong clue does not give rise to a presumption that a patent subject to a terminal disclaimer is 
patentably indistinct from its parent patents. It follows that a court may not presume that assertions of a 
parent patent and a terminally-disclaimed continuation patent against the same product constitute the 
same cause of action. Rather, the claim preclusion analysis requires comparing the patents’ claims 
along with other relevant transactional facts.”). 
262. See Pharmacia Corp. v. Par Pharm., Inc., 417 F.3d 1369, 1373-1375 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
(admitting that although “terminal disclaimer ties the affected patents together; they expire on the same 
date and are enforceable only during periods in which they are owned by the same person. . . . Beyond 
their shared expiration date, however, two disclaimed patents maintain significant attributes of 
individuality;” and that patents bind by terminal disclaimers are independently presumed valid 
(emphasis added). Moreover, the Federal Circuit court also recognized the exculpatory language in the 
terminal disclaimer and states that “this language shows that the patentee justifiably expected individual 
treatment of the patents beyond their shared expiration date.” In conclusion, the Federal Circuit 
concluded that the terminal disclaimer alone did not bind the ‘368 patent and the ‘504 patent together 
for purposes of unenforceability due to inequitable conduct). 
263. See Ortho Pharm. Corp., 959 F.2d at 941. 
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patents all bound by terminal disclaimers to serve as multiple obstacles and 
“multiple lives” for invalidation. 
Since this is an issue for patents in general, it is unsurprising that both 
small-molecule drugs and biologics are capable of forming Type II Patent 
Thickets as shown in the empirical research of this article.264 
2. Type I Patent Thickets: Unique Nature of Biologics and Biosimilars 
While both small-molecule and biologics are capable of forming Type 
II Patent Thickets, Type I Patent Thickets are arguably more possible to be 
formed by biologics. This is due to the nature of biologics. A biologic has 
significantly more “aspects”—manufacturing, in particular 265— that can be 
covered by patents. To illustrate this, Figure 22 presents the number of core 
patents of the selected drugs by category.266 
For the composition of matter patents, small-molecule drugs have the 
molecule itself and its polymorphs to be claimed; while for biologics, not 
only the protein itself, but also its variants and their properties can be 
claimed. For example, the composition of matter patents covering 
Revlimid® are only the molecule itself267 and its polymorphs.268 However, 
for the biologic Humira®, the patents not only include the monoclonal 
antibody269 but also include a great variety of variants and the properties of 
the variants.270 
Manufacture patents are what mostly make up the difference between 
biologics and small-molecule drugs. It is also this difference that allows 
biologic patent thickets, especially Type I Patent Thickets to be formed.271 
 
264. Both the small-molecule drug Revlimid and the biologic Humira have filed a large number 
of terminal disclaimers and amounted to Type II Patent Thickets. See, supra Part IV.B.2. 
265. See, infra Figure 22; see LYBECKER, supra note 245 at 17 (stating that “process patents are 
proportionally more important [in comparison to composition of matter patents].”). 
266. The number of patents is calibrated to exclude the interplay of Type II Patent clusters: 
overlapping patents (or patents prone to double-patenting) tied by the same terminal disclaimer are 
collectively counted as “one patent.”  
267. U.S. Patent No. 5,635,517, issued Jun. 3, 1997. 
268. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 7,465,800, issued Dec. 16, 2008; U.S. Patent No. 7,855,217, issued 
Dec. 21, 2010 (both claiming crystalline hemihydrate forms of the drug).  
269. U.S. Patent No. 6,090,382, issued Jul. 18, 2000. 
270. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 9,255,143, issued Feb. 9, 2016 (claiming adalimumab having 
“more than 25% of the total N-linked oligosaccharides present”); U.S. Patent No. 9,505,833, issued 
Nov. 29, 2016 (claiming “methylglyoxal (MGO)-modified forms” of adalimumab); U.S. Patent No. 
9,683,033, issued Jun. 20, 2017 (claiming a “composition compris[ing] less than 10% total acidic 
species of adalimumab”); U.S. Patent No. 9,085,618, issued Jul. 21, 2015 (claiming the properties of 
lysine variant species). 
271. If we exclude the manufacturing patents of biologics, their number of patents will instantly 
be cut in half. 
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Among the selected drugs, only biologics have core manufacture patents,272 
with Rituxan® and Humira® having 31 and 27 core manufacture patents, 
respectively. This finding would not come as a surprise as the manufacture 
is the key to biologics.273 The processes these patents claim include the 
general manufacture method of the drug;274 general processes where a 
particular step is emphasized;275 the purification of proteins;276 the methods 
to control the expression or species of proteins;277 and even ways to 
improve immunoglobin productions.278 
Formulations are also critical to biologics.279 As such, patents that 
cover formulations are also an aspect that manufacturers can claim.280 
However, when it comes to treatment patents, the number can be more 
drug-specific than drug-type specific as the number of indications depends 
 
272. A potential argument would be that the Orange Book does not allow the listing of process 
patents. See 21 CFR 314.53 (b)(1) (stating that “[p]rocess patents, patents claiming packaging, patents 
claiming metabolites, and patents claiming intermediates are not covered by this section, and 
information on these patents must not be submitted to FDA.”). The rebuttal to this argument is (1) core 
patents also include patents that were asserted in lawsuits (See supra Part III.C.4.), not only those listed 
on the Orange Book; and (2) even if conceding the fact that the manufacture patents of small-molecule 
drugs are not included in core patents, small-molecule drugs still have lower numbers of manufacturing 
patents when we include peripheral patents. The number of manufacturing patents (both core and 
peripheral patents included) of the small-molecule drugs Revlimid, Eliquis, and Lyrica are 2, 0, and 
10; while that of the biologics Humira, Enbrel, and Rituxan, are 42, 27, and 41, respectively. 
273. See, supra Part II.B. 
274. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 8,163,522, issued Apr. 24, 2012 (claiming the general 
manufacturing process of etanercept, or Enbrel®); U.S. Patent No. 9,284,371, issued Mar. 15, 206 
(claiming the method of producing adalimumab, or Humira®). 
275. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 9,234,032, issued Jan. 12, 2016 (claiming a fed-batch method to 
produce adalimumab with an emphasis on the conditions of the fed-batches.) 
276. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 7,485,704, issued Feb. 3, 2009; U.S. Patent No. 8,231,876, issued 
Jul. 31, 2012. 
277. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 9,062,106, issued Jun. 23, 2015 (claiming “A method for increasing 
the galactosylation level of a recombinantly expressed adalimumab”); U.S. Patent No. 9,150,645, issued 
Oct. 6, 2015 (claiming cell culture methods to reduce acidic species); U.S. Patent No. 9,234,033, issued 
Jan. 12, 2016 (claiming a method to control protein heterogeneity).  
278. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 8,314,225, issued Nov. 20, 2012. 
279. See Felicity Thomas, Rising to the Challenge of Biologic Drug Formulation, PHARMTECH 
(Mar. 2, 2019), http://www.pharmtech.com/rising-challenge-biologic-drug-formulation (stating that 
poorly formulated drugs may have significant impacts both on development, efficacy and patient 
safety—”[t]he drug must be thermally stable, possibly resistant to oxidation, and tolerate variations in 
light and other environmental stresses placed on it during manufacturing and packaging;” moreover, 
solubility must be assessed to ensure  “that the formulation will result in high bioavailability without 
degrading or otherwise damaging the biologic itself.” Further challenges are also created “due to the 
varied nature and three-dimensional structure of different biologics”); see Sven Frokjaer & Daniel E. 
Otzen, Protein Drug Stability: A Formulation Challenge, 4 NATURE REVIEWS DRUG DISCOVER 298, 
298 (2005).  
280. For example, the formulation patents of Humira®. See, supra Part IV.B.3. at Table 8. 
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more on what drug it is than whether the drug is a biologic or a small-
molecule drug.281 
The number of core patents covering Revlimid® is quite interestingly 
high, given the fact that its small-molecule peers have fewer than ten core 
patents (Figure 22).  This is because Celgene exploited the fact that 
Revlimid ® requires FDA Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies 282 
approval.283 According to the study, of the 29 core patents, 10 are patents 
directed to cover Revlimid’s drug distribution system, amounting to the 
difference in patent counts compared to the other selected small-molecule 
drugs.284 
As in the number of treatment patents, the difference in number of 
patents covering Revlimid® is a manifestation of the fact that the number of 
patents is also prone to be influenced by the nature of the drug itself and 
not just by whether the drug is a small-molecule or biologic. Along the 
same line of reasoning, the finding that the biologic Enbrel® has a relatively 
lower patent count compared to its biologic counterparts could probably be 
explained for similar reasons.285 However, despite these factors, we still see 
 
281. For example, as of May 28, 2019, the biologic Humira® has 10 indications. See, Highlights of 
Prescribing Information, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN at 1, 
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2018/125057s409lbl.pdf#page=1 (last visited 
Jun. 29, 2019). Both the small-molecule Revlimid® and the biologic Rituxan® has only 4 and 5 
indications respectively. See Highlights of Prescribing Information, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN at 1, 
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2019/021880s056lbl.pdf#page=1 (last visited 
Jun. 29, 2019); Highlights of Prescribing Information, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN at 1, 
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2019/103705s5454lbl.pdf#page=1 (last visited 
Jun. 29, 2019). This difference in the number of indications is reflected in the number of treatment 
patents. Humira has 28 treatment patents while both Rituxan® and Revlimid® only have 11. 
282. Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies, or REMS is “a drug safety program that the U.S. 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) can require for certain medications with serious safety concerns 
to help ensure the benefits of the medication outweigh its risks.” Risk Evaluation and Mitigation 
Strategies (REMS), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/ (last updated: Feb. 2, 2018). 
283. See Alison Kodjak, How a Drugmaker Gamed the System to Keep Generic Competition 
Away, NPR (May 17, 2018), https://www.npr.org/. 
284. By patenting the drug’s distribution system, generics that seek to commercialize the drug 
would need to invalidate the patent or at least negotiate with Celgene to implement the drug distribution 
system, as FDA requires generics to use the same REMS as branded companies. See id. But see 
Statement from FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb, M.D., On New Policies to Reduce the Ability of 
Brand Drug Makers to Use REMS Programs As a Way to Block Timely Generic Drug Entry, Helping 
Promote Competition and Access, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (May 31, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/ 
(stating that FDA may consider waiving the requirement of generics to implement the same REMS as 
the branded drug company). Another way brand companies can restrict competition by exploiting the 
REMS programs is to refuse to sell generic companies’ drugs when generics need at least 5,000 doses 
of the brand drug to run bioequivalence and bioavailability studies. The “reasoning” behind this refusal 
to deal is to argue that this violates their REMS regulation. See id. 
285. For example, Enbrel® is a fusion protein. Unlike Humira® and Rituxan®, which are 
monoclonal antibodies, the manufacture process of fusion proteins does not involve antibody 
production. See Cynthia A. Challener, Fusion Proteins Pose Manufacturability Challenges, 30 
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the general trend that biologics are more capable of and more prone to 
forming Type I Patent Thickets compared to small-molecules. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 22: Calibrated Core Patents Counts by Category286 
Source: own construction based on patents retrieved in empirical 
study. 
 
The other reason that Type I Patent Thickets exist is biosimilars 
simply being bio-“similars.” Being “similar” allows the possibility to be 
different from the reference biologic product,287 meaning that there can be 
patents that do not claim the reference biologic product itself but are 
potential threats to the entry for biosimilars.288 These patents are rightfully 
considered as part of the patent thicket—since they hinder biosimilar 
 
BIOPHARM INT’L 30-31, 37 (2017); see Lucas Silva Carvalho et al., Production Processes for 
Monoclonal Antibodies, INTECHOPEN (Feb. 8, 2017), https://www.intechopen.com/. This difference in 
manufacturing processes may partially explain the differences in the number of manufacturing patents 
between these biologics.  
286. For comparison purposes, patents that claims different categories in the same patent, for 
example those that claim both the composition of matter and the manufacture thereof, are categorized in 
the “others” group.  
287. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 57. 
288. See, e.g., BI’s Amended Answers at 64 (stating that the asserted patents do not cover the 
reference product); see supra note 169. 
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entry—and are not unlawful being in the hands of reference product 
sponsors even though they do not claim the reference product itself.289 In 
fact, the existence of these patents merely indicates that the reference 
product sponsors are playing the patent game very well.290 The issue that 
patent owners do not exercise the inventions in their patents has always 
existed in the patent system and is entirely legal and even rewarding under 
our patent system.291 
This problem has not surfaced, or at least not magnified, for small-
molecule drugs because there is no such thing as being “similar” for small-
molecule drugs. Small-molecule generic drugs are required to be bio-
”equivalent.”292 Therefore, small-molecule generic manufacturers would 
only need to worry about the patents that cover the brand name small-
molecule drug. But for biosimilars manufacturers, they have to hack 
through or scrutinize not only the patents claiming the reference biologic 
product itself, but also patents that claim its variations. With this in mind, 
interchangeability status may shed some light on circumventing these Type 
I Patent Thickets; since theoretically, achieving interchangeability would 
indicate higher biosimilarity, and the patents that need to be hacked 
through would consequently decrease.293 
VII. SOLUTIONS TO THE BIOLOGIC PATENT THICKET PROBLEM 
With the orchestrations of patent thickets and its potential problematic 
consequences in mind, a discussion on possible solutions to the patent 
thicket problem is needed. 
 
289. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (stating that a grant to the patentee “the right to exclude others from making, 
using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States or importing the invention 
into the United States, and, if the invention is a process, of the right to exclude others from using, 
offering for sale or selling throughout the United States, or importing into the United States, products 
made by that process, referring to the specification for the particulars thereof.” Nowhere does it require 
nor provide the right for the patentee to exercise the invention claimed). 
290. They are playing well in that they file patents that claim what their potential competitors 
would manufacture. The “best players” in the patent systems are those that file patents that claim what 
potential competitors may commercialize. Patent Trolls—entities that “[do] not make or sell a particular 
item or service, but who [seek] to enforce patent rights against alleged infringers in an attempt to collect 
licensing fees”—is a good demonstration of this concept.  BUS. L. INC., CORP. COUNSEL’S GUIDE TO 
INTEL. PROP. § 1:47 (2018 ed.). 
291. See Nick Statt, Apple Ordered to Pay Patent Troll More Than $500 Million in iMessage 
Case, THE VERGE (Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.theverge.com/. But see, Lauren Cohen et al., The 
Growing Problem of Patent Trolling, 352 SCI. 521, 521-522 (2016) (condemning the problem of patent 
trolls). 
292. See Bagley, supra note 48. 
293. See, infra, Part VII.B.2. 
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In this Part, Section A first discusses why a comprehensive optimal 
solution to the patent thicket problem is not easily obtainable. Section B 
then covers how a current proposal raised by legislators would help 
increase the transparency of the problem. Section B also proposes that 
transparency can be increased by demanding interchangeability patent 
listing. Next, Section C explains how antitrust may serve as an ex post 
regulation by deeming the act of using patent thickets to restrain 
competition unlawful. Finally, Section D presents ex ante regulation 
proposals that may aid in alleviating the patent thicket problem. 
A. A Thorny Issue to Tackle 
Before discussing the solutions, this Section explains why biologic 
patent thickets is a thorny issue to tackle. First, as Sub-Section 1 argues, 
whether a patent thicket exists is challenging to identify. Second, though 
patent thickets have problematic consequences, Sub-Section 2 argues that 
the laws that allow them to exist in the first place are not without merits. 
There are justifiable reasons why the patents in these patent thickets exist. 
Thus, it is crucial that we do not throw the baby out with the bathwater 
when attempting to solve the patent thicket problem. Third, it would be 
tough to prove patent thickets unlawful by relying on patent litigation 
defenses. Moreover, even if there exist applicable patent defenses, the 
defendant, or biosimilar companies, would have to stay and fight through 
the litigation. However, as Sub-Section 4 covers, due to the misaligned 
interests with patients, biosimilar companies are unlikely to persist in the 
lawsuit. 
1. Definition 
The very first challenge is the definition issue. It is difficult to draw a 
clear-cut line as to how many patents amount to a patent thicket.294 
Admittedly, this article merely uses relative patent counts to assess the 
existence of Type I and Type II Patent Thickets without assigning absolute 
 
294. See Memorandum and Order Concerning Doc. No. 71 at *4 n.3, AbbVie Inc. et al v. 
Boehringer Ingelheim International GMBH et al, CIVIL No. 17-1065-MSG-RL (D. Del. Jun. 4, 2018) 
(No. 112), https://casetext.com/ (hereinafter, “Memorandum”) (citing that “the boundary line [of patent 
thickets] between licit and illicit conduct might be, is not clear.”).  
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cut-values.295 It is relatively harder to solve the problem if there can be 
times when we are unsure whether the problem exists.296 
2. Babies and bathwater 
Although both Type I and Type II Patent Thickets have problematic 
consequences, such as increased monitoring, transaction and litigation costs 
of biosimilar manufacturers and thus the delay of their market entries,297 
the primary purposes of the laws that allow the formation of patent thickets 
are not without merits. Continuously granting patently distinct inventions 
in different patents provides innovation incentives;298 while allowing 
obvious-type double patenting rejections to be overcome-able by filing 
terminal disclaimers encourages inventors to disclose incremental 
improvements of their already-patented inventions.299 Even though its 
negative impacts are real, it is critical that we do not throw the baby out 
with the bathwater when we attempt to deal with these impacts. We should 
not sacrifice the benefits provided by these laws for the sole reason of 
ridding patent thickets or its undesirable effects. However, to achieve a 
sweet spot where innovation is rewarding but at an acceptable cost of 
public interest is anything but simple. 
3. Patent defenses are impractical 
Given the fact that the patents granted in the alleged Type I and Type 
II Patent Thickets are not entirely without merits and that the line of what 
accumulates to a patent thicket is unclear, courts may be reluctant to accept 
the act of amassing and asserting a purported large number of patents being 
unlawful.300 
 
295. See, supra Part IV.B.2.; see also, supra note 192. 
296. But see Affordable Prescriptions for Patients Act of 2019, S.1416, 116th Cong. § 27 (a)(11) 
(2019) (a bill introduced attempting to define what patent thicketing is rather the absolute number of 
patents that would qualify as a patent thicket). 
297. See, supra Part V. 
298. See ROBERT A. MATTHEWS, JR., 1 ANNOTATED PATENT DIGEST § 1:2 (updated: Jun, 2019). 
Granting patents to newly patently distinct inventions encourages continuous innovation; and when the 
patents expire, the inventions are contributed to the public. See Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 
U.S. 257, 262 (1979). If patently distinct follow-on inventions were instead consolidated into the first 
patent, inventors would have less incentive to disclose follow-on inventions or to improve patented 
inventions.  
299. In re Van Ornum, 686 F.2d at 948; see P. J. Federico, supra note 257; see, supra Part VI.B.1.   
300. See Memorandum at *4 n.3 (stating “[w]hether the creation of a “patent thicket” can amount 
to a cognizable defense to a claim of patent infringement,”). 
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Nonetheless, Boehringer Ingelheim attempted to argue that such act is 
unlawful by raising the “unclean hands defense301“ against AbbVie when 
AbbVie promised the enforcement of its “patent estate.” The unclean hands 
defense “is an equitable defense in which the defendant argues that the 
plaintiff is not entitled to relief on account of the fact that the plaintiff is 
acting unethically or has acted in bad faith with respect to the subject of the 
complaint.”302 In mounting this defense, Boehringer Ingelheim is 
essentially accusing that the alleged “wrongful” patent thicket is causing 
the launch delay of Boehringer Ingelheim’s biosimilar.303 However, it is 
unclear “[w]hether the creation of a “patent thicket” can amount to a 
cognizable defense to a claim of patent infringement.”304 After all, as courts 
acknowledge, “[t]he simple act of applying for and receiving a patent, 
standing alone, can hardly be the basis for patent invalidation.”305 
Other traditional patent defenses may also be unfeasible or impractical 
for patent thickets. For example, patent misuse defense would be 
unsuccessful, because theoretically, the patent owner has not 
“impermissibly broaden the scope of the patent grant.”306 
4. Misaligned interests 
Even if the unclean hands defense is applicable, to succeed in this 
defense, the defendant bears the burden to prove that the cause of its 
biosimilar launch delay resulted from the alleged patent thicket.307 The 
nature of this defense paradoxically tilts biosimilar manufacturers to settle 
rather than to stay and fight. To prove biosimilar launch delays, the 
 
301. See BI’s Amended Answers at 39 (stating that “[p]laintiffs cannot obtain relief, including 
injunctive relief, because of their unclean hands,”); see also id. at 74 (stating that “Plaintiffs’ efforts to 
create a patent thicket or estate in the United States are part of a global effort to improperly delay 
competition with respect to adalimumab”); see  Silbersher, supra note 122 (stating that “[Boehringer 
Ingelheim]’s defense is very unique. . .[and] is essentially untested.”). 
302. LAWRENCE M. SUNG & JEFF E. SCHWARTZ, PATENT LAW HANDBOOK § 5:7 (2018-2019 ed.). 
303. See BI’s Amended Answers at 40. 
304. See Memorandum at *4 n.3. 
305. Id.  
306. SUNG & SCHWARTZ, supra note 302 at § 5:6 (stating that “[t]he policy of the patent misuse 
doctrine is to prevent a patentee from using the patent to obtain market benefit beyond that which inures 
in the statutory patent right. (Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336, 1341, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d 1481, 
2004-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 74358 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 
F.2d 700, 704, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d 1173 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (abrogated by, Impression Products, Inc. v. 
Lexmark Intern., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 198 L. Ed. 2d 1, 122 U.S.P.Q.2d 1605 (2017)))). . .in the cases 
in which the restriction is reasonably within the patent grant, the patent misuse defense can never 
succeed.”). 
307. Id. at § 5:7 (“[t]he defendant bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence 
that the plaintiff acted with unclean hands.”). 
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biosimilar launching plans, a typically “highly confidential and tightly 
guarded information,”308 are likely to be the subject of discovery.309 The 
eventual settlement between AbbVie and Boehringer Ingelheim 
demonstrates perfectly well that the interests of patients and biosimilar 
manufacturers are misaligned.310 
A system that relies on the entry of biosimilars to drive down biologic 
prices rests on the assumption that the patients and biosimilar 
manufacturers are aligned. The patent thickets exploit the fact that they are 
not.311 
B. Increasing Transparency 
Regardless of what methods are chosen to solve the patent thicket 
problem, transparency will always be a critical component. Without 
transparency, legislators and the public would have little idea of what is 
happening. This Section acknowledges the current legislative effort—the 
proposed Purple Book Continuity Act of 2019—while delineating out 
points that may warrant improvement. 
1. Purple Book Continuity Act of 2019 
Recently passed House on May 8th, 2019, the Purple Book Continuity 
Act of 2019312 aims to increase the transparency of the patent dance by 
requiring reference product sponsors to publicize the exchange list codified 
in 42 U.S.C. 262 (k)(l)(3)(A).313 However, unlike small-molecule drugs,314 
the timing of patent listing in the Purple Continuity Act is set at no later 
 
308. Zachary Silbersher, Is Boehringer Ingelheim Planning to Launch Its Humira Biosimilar At 
Risk?, MARKMAN ADVISORS (Dec. 13, 2018), https://www.markmanadvisors.com/. 
309. For example, in AbbVie Inc. et al v. Boehringer Ingelheim International GMBH et al, CIVIL, 
No. 17-1065-MSG-RL (D. Del. filed Aug. 2, 2017), the plaintiff, AbbVie, had successfully persuaded 
the court to compel the discovery of the defendant, Boehringer Ingelheim’s biosimilar launch plans. See 
Memorandum concerning Plaintiff’s Motion for more Complete Interrogatory Answers at 9, AbbVie 
Inc. et al v. Boehringer Ingelheim International GMBH et al, CIVIL No. 17-1065-MSG-RL (D. Del. 
Feb. 22, 2019) (No. 234), https://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-
courts/delaware/dedce/1:2017cv01065/62839/428. 
310. See id. 
311. Silbersher, supra note 211. 
312. Purple Book Continuity Act of 2019, H.R.1520, 116th Cong. (2019), hereinafter as “Purple 
Book Continuity Act.” 
313. See id. at § 2 (stating that “the reference product sponsor shall provide such list of patents 
[(list of patents under subsection (l)(3)(A))] (or supplement thereto) and their corresponding expiry 
dates to the Secretary, and the Secretary shall, in revisions made under clause (ii), include such 
information for such biological product . . .”). 
314. Patent information must be submitted along with the New Drug Application. See 21 CFR 
314.53(b)(1).  
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than 30 days after reference sponsors provide the patent list codified in 42. 
U.S.C. 262 (k)(l)(3)(A). This timing is when the patent dance music has 
just begun, rather when reference product sponsors first file their Biologic 
License Applications.315 
If this version of bill becomes law, biosimilar manufacturers would 
undoubtedly benefit by being able to narrow down on what patents 
reference product sponsors would likely assert and by being less vulnerable 
to the abuse of reference product sponsors listing irrelevant patents on the 
patent list. 
However, the extent of these benefits is limited. First, the publication 
of patent information is set only after the engagement of the first biosimilar 
applicant. Thus, only following biosimilar applicants will benefit from this 
amendment. Therefore, without providing additional incentives, biosimilar 
applicants may be discouraged to become the first to engage in the patent 
dance.316 Second, consider the nature of biosimilars. As explained 
previously, patents that block one particular biosimilar may not inevitably 
hinder the entry of another.317 Thus, even if biosimilar manufacturers learn 
what patents other applicants were asserted against, the knowledge may not 
necessarily apply to themselves. Biosimilar applicants may still have to 
conduct a scrutinized patent search and analysis themselves. 
2. Interchangeability patent listing 
As a method to address the aforementioned limitations in the Purple 
Book Continuity Act, this article proposes adding “interchangeability patent 
listing.” Congress can mandate biologic companies to disclose patents that 
they believe can reasonably assert against applicants whose biosimilars 
have achieved interchangeable status when filing their biologics licenses 
applications. This requirement would provide an earlier publication of 
patents that do cover the reference product itself, which in theory, would 
 
315. Purple Book Continuity Act § 2 (“Not later than 30 days after a list of patents under 
subsection (l)(3)(A), or a supplement to such list under subsection (l)(7), has been provided by the 
reference product sponsor to the subsection (k) applicant respecting a biological product included on the 
list published under this subparagraph, the reference product sponsor shall provide such list of 
patents . . .”). 
316. Note that no incentive is provided to the first biosimilar applicant. See generally, 42 U.S.C. § 
262. Only the first applicant that achieves interchangeability is entitled a one-year-exclusivity. 42 
U.S.C. § 262(k)(6). 
317. See, supra Part III.C.4. 
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most likely be the patents that all manufacturers of biosimilars, including 
those with and without interchangeability, need to hack through.318 
C. Ex Post Regulations 
The solution does not stop here. Increasing transparency does not 
change the fact that there would still be many patents, nor does it help 
biosimilar manufacturers circumvent the effects of these alleged patent 
thickets. This Section discusses how ex post regulation, antitrust in 
particular, may disincentivize companies from forming Type I and Type II 
Patent Thickets by deeming the act of deliberately restricting competition 
by amassing a large number of patents unlawful. 
Sub-section 1 first points out current ongoing antitrust lawsuits against 
the alleged formation of AbbVie’s patent thicket and its purportedly 
improper use as a means to illegally restrain trade. This article argues that 
antitrust litigations by consumers may currently be the most feasible way to 
address patent thickets. However, with the many obstacles to overcome, the 
lawsuit would not be an easy battle for the plaintiffs. In particular, this 
article argues that under the current antitrust regime, plaintiffs need to 
argue that the present patent thicket is more of a Type II Patent Thicket as 
opposed to a Type I Patent Thicket to prevail. 
To make things easier, Congress can codify the act of using patent 
thickets to restrain competition as illegal. As such, a bill was introduced 
recently by the Senate to target patent thickets directly. Sub-section 2 turns 
to discuss what the bill entails and how it would potentially solve some of 
the thorny problems patent thickets present if it does make it into law. The 
bill targets not only Type II Patent Thickets but also Type I Patent Thickets 
without severely sacrificing the merits patents in the Type I Patent Thicket 
may provide. 
1. Antitrust litigation: In re: Humira (Adalimumab) Antitrust 
Litigation319 as the example 
AbbVie’s patent strategy has drawn publicity, criticism and legal 
attention alike, with several organizations accusing its patent thicket of 
 
318. This conclusion relies on the assumption that the reference product and interchangeable 
biosimilar are more similar in general compared to biosimilars that cannot achieve interchangeable 
status. However, note that interchangeability is defined in terms of clinical efficacy and safety rather 
than equivalence. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 262(k)(4)(A)(ii), (B). 
319. In re: Humira (Adalimumab) Antitrust Litigation, CIVIL No.1:19-cv-01873 (N.D. Ill., 
consolidated Jun. 4, 2019), hereinafter “In re: Humira Antitrust Litigation.” 
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being anticompetitive.320 Along with several pay-for-delay class actions, 
the lawsuits were consolidated into In re: Humira (Adalimumab) Antitrust 
Litigation.321 The class actions have accused AbbVie of the following three 
wrongdoings: (1) illegitimate accumulation of more than 100 patents 
covering Humira; (2) improper deals for delaying competition until 2023 
in the U.S.; and (3) anticompetitive agreement in allowing Amgen earlier 
entry than biosimilar manufacturers in the U.S.322 
Antitrust litigation may currently be the most feasible way to combat 
patent thickets. First, the plaintiffs of the class action suits are consumers, 
rather than biosimilar manufacturers, they are more likely to stay and fight 
the battle.323 Second, the act of using patent thickets to maintain monopoly 
status have a slight chance to fall in what Sherman Act § 2 and what the 
Court’s leading decision, United States v. Grinnell Corp.324  defines and 
articulates as “the offense of actual monopolization.” However, it should be 
emphasized that there are controversial issues in this argument. This article 
will not ambitiously conclude that courts will find patent thickets 
anticompetitive or by doing so eliminate the patent thicket problem. 
Instead, this article intends to identify the potential challenging issues 
plaintiffs may face in the present antitrust litigation and to opine on how 
such issues could be argued to reach a more fruitful result. 
Sherman Act § 2 does not delineate the specific elements of the 
offense of actual monopolization as it only states that it is illegal for anyone 
to “monopolize. . .any part of the trade or commerce among the several 
States, or with foreign nations.”325 Therefore, the Supreme Court has 
outlined the two elements that constitutes offense of actual monopoly under 
Sherman Act § 2: “(1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant 
market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as 
distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior 
product, business acumen, or historic accident.”326 
 
320. Eric Sagonowsky, AbbVie’s Humira Antitrust Woes Snowball as Class-Action Plaintiffs Pile 
In, FIERCEPHARMA (Apr. 3, 2019), https://www.fiercepharma.com/. 
321. In re: Humira Antitrust Litigation, No. 93, (N.D. Ill. Jun. 4, 2019). 
322. Jeff Overley, Meet the Top Attorneys in AbbVie’s Antitrust Battle Royal, LAW360 (Jun. 7, 
2019), https://www.law360.com/articles/1145098/meet-the-top-attys-in-abbvie-s-antitrust-battle-royal. 
323. Silbersher, supra note 211. 
324. U.S. v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–571 (1966). 
325. 15 U.S.C. § 2; see WILLIAM C. HOLMES & MELISSA MANGIARACINA, ANTITRUST LAW 
HANDBOOK § 3:3 (2018-2019 ed.). 
326. See id.; see also Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. at 563, 570–571; Verizon Communications Inc. v. 
Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 124 (2004) (“It is settled law that [the] offense [of 
monopolization] requires, in addition to the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market, ‘the 
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The first element would be relatively easy to demonstrate. To do so, 
plaintiffs would need to first identify the relevant product and the 
geographic dimensions of the market,327 and then show proof that “the 
defendant possesses [‘monopoly power’] within the relevant market.”328 
The relevant product is adalimumab, including Humira® and its biosimilars; 
and the geographic area is the United States. Abbvie’s monopoly power can 
be shown by stating that AbbVie has 100% of the sales share in the relevant 
product and market during the given period and presenting the fact that 
other biosimilars or biologics are not interchangeable with Humira®.329 
The second element is the hard part. Plaintiffs have to demonstrate 
that AbbVie willfully acquired or maintained its monopoly power, “as 
distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior 
product, business acumen, or historic accident.”330 This element is difficult 
to establish as courts have been reluctant to penalize monopolists that 
engage in normal competitive behavior that is allowed to smaller 
competing firms solely because the monopolist is dominant.331 The issue at 
stake would thus be whether filing a massive number of patents and 
vigorously asserting them constitutes an unlawful act. If AbbVie believes 
that the patent suits are not without merit, which AbbVie would no doubt 
vigorously defend, courts would probably side with AbbVie.332 Moreover, 
the act of being litigious does not constitute a sham as long as there were 
“plausible argument[s in the suit] on which [patent owners] could have 
prevailed.”333 
However, courts have held that monopolists that tend to further 
establish their monopoly position to restrict competition rather than for 
legitimate business purposes violate Sherman Act § 2 even when the 
 
willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a 
consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.’”). 
327. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. U.S., 221 U.S. 1, 61 (1911). 
328. See  HOLMES & MANGIARACINA, supra note 330, § 3:4. 
329. See id. 
330. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. at 570–571. 
331. See HOLMES & MANGIARACINA, supra note 326. 
332. C.f. Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., 508 U.S. 
49, 50 (1993) (filing a copyright infringement suit against plaintiff is not an act of monopolization 
where defendant had probable cause to believe the action is not without merit. To be held as a sham, a 
two-tier test must be satisfied: “First, the lawsuit must be objectively baseless in the sense that no 
reasonable litigant could realistically expect success on the merits;” and second, “whether the baseless 
suit conceals ‘an attempt to interfere directly’ with a competitor’s business relationships.”). 
333. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 552 F.3d 1033, 1046 (9th Cir. 2009). 
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defendant’s conduct is not otherwise illegal.334 Unfortunately, none of these 
precedents show that the act of monopolists asserting a sheer amount of 
presumed valid and enforceable patents violates Sherman Act § 2.335 The 
plaintiffs in In re: Humira Antitrust Litigation would probably have a better 
chance in proving the second element by emphasizing that the patents 
covering Humira®  are overlapping, non-inventive, or perhaps even 
obtained through fraudulent conduct, if possible. That is, they should argue 
that the Humira® patent thicket is more of a Type II rather than a Type I 
Patent Thicket. However, from the study of this article, we know that the 
Humira® patent thicket may be more of a combination of both types of 
patent thickets.336 
In sum, for In re: Humira Antitrust Litigation, the court would have to 
answer at least the following three questions to arrive at a conclusion that 
Humira®’s patent thicket is anticompetitive: (1) whether the act of 
monopolists obtaining Type I Patent Thickets and using them to block 
competition is anticompetitive; (2) whether the act of monopolists 
obtaining Type II Patent Thickets and using them to block competition is 
anticompetitive; and if the court finds opposite answers to the former two 
questions, (3) whether or to what extent does each of the two former acts 
taint the other to render the “entire act of patent thicketing” a violation of 
Sherman Act § 2.337 These questions are also the very hurdles the plaintiffs 
in the present case are facing. 
 
334. See HOLMES & MANGIARACINA, supra note 325. (“For example, illegal monopolizing 
conduct has been found in. . .a monopolist’s exploitation of a fraudulently procured patent or otherwise 
sham litigation to drive competitors from the market; [See Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food 
Machinery & Chemical Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177; see also In re Lipitor Antitrust Litigation, 868 F.3d 
231, 270 (2018) (reversing a dismissal of a “Walker Process” claim in which the defendant fraudulently 
procured a patent and subsequently used it to restrict competition.)] and in extreme instances of tortious 
misconduct, fraud, and other exclusionary acts used to entrench the defendant’s monopoly position 
without any plausible procompetitive explanation. [See Xechem, Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 372 
F.3d 899, 901 (7th Cir. 2004) (stating that the district court erred in dismissing a claim that accused the 
defendant of filing false patents to the FDA and by exploiting FDA laws, stymied generic competition. 
In the reversal, the court specifically stated that “[e]xclusionary patent-related practices that violate the 
antitrust laws are valid claims.”]). 
335. See id. 
336. The patents in Type I Patent Thickets are arguably patently distinct and should be 
independently presumed valid and enforceable.  
337. Note that the third question is only fair for patent owners since not all patents in the patent 
thicket are created equal. Treating different patents unitedly as one would be irresponsible if the third 
question was not answered persuasively. However, there is precedent that different patent claims are 
treated unitedly as in inequitable conducts, which may serve as a cross-reference in the present lawsuit. 
See Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 877 (Fed.Cir.1988) (“When a 
court has finally determined that inequitable conduct occurred in relation to one or more claims during 
prosecution of the patent application, the entire patent is rendered unenforceable.”) Nevertheless, these 
precedents do not expand across the borders of different patents (See Pharmacia Corp., 417 F.3d at 1375 
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2. Affordable Prescriptions for Patients Act of 2019 
To make it easier for courts to decide on the anticompetitive effect of 
patent thickets, Congress can codify the act of “patent thicketing” as 
anticompetitive into law. As such, introduced in the Senate on May 9th, 
2019, the Affordable Prescriptions for Patients Act of 2019338 is the only 
bill introduced that attempts to target patent thickets directly so far.339 
Moreover, the bill also aims to give the Federal Trade Commission more 
strength on this matter.340 
The Affordable Prescription for Patients Act characterizes the act of 
using patent thickets to restrict competition as “patent thicketing”: 
“an action taken to limit competition by a patentee with 
respect to a drug approved. . .in which (i)_(I) the patentee 
obtains patents in the same patent family . . . (aa) that claim 
the drug or biological product. . .and (bb) whose effective 
filing date does not precede the date of filing the application 
[for New Drug Application or Biologic License 
Application]. . .; or (II) the underlying composition of matter 
patent is found invalid and the patentee obtains patents in the 
same patent family or patent portfolio that claim [other 
aspects of] the drug or biological product. . .; (ii) an 
abbreviated new drug application referencing such approved 
drug or a biosimilar biological product license application 
referencing such licensed biological product could not be 
marketed without practicing one or more of the inventions 
claimed in the additional patents described [herein]; and (iii) 
the Commission determines that the patentee improperly 
limited competition by obtaining patents described 
[herein.]”341 
The bill also provides additional factors the Federal Trade 
Commission can consider when determining whether patent thicketing 
exists, including whether (1) the additional patents stem from few patent 
families; (2) the additional patents have common specifications; (3) the 
additional patents did not issue on an application that underwent restriction; 
 
(stating that the case law that inequitable conduct occurring in one or more claims during prosecution of 
patent application, “however, applies only to claims in one patent.”)), and it would be up to the court of 
this case to determine whether the purportedly wrongdoing of Type II Patent Thickets would infect the 
presumably legal Type I Patent Thickets. 
338. Affordable Prescriptions for Patients Act of 2019, S.1416, 116th Cong. (2019), hereinafter 
“Affordable Prescriptions for Patients Act.” 
339. See Affordable Prescriptions for Patients Act § 27. 
340. Affordable Prescriptions for Patients Act (stating that the purpose of the Act is “[t]o amend 
the Federal Trade Commission Act to prohibit anticompetitive behaviors” such as patent thicketing and 
product hopping). 
341. Affordable Prescriptions for Patients Act § 27(a)(11)(A). 
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(4) the additional patents have overlapping or identical claims; (5) the 
additional patents have been granted to the patentee on formulations or 
compositions of the product and not used; (6) one or more of the additional 
patents have been invalidated in an inter partes review and others.342 
In general, the bill delineates a decently comprehensive definition for 
patent thicketing. Notice that the definition of patent thicketing also 
includes patents that belong in the Type I Patent Thicket.343 Nevertheless, 
the bill does not entirely sacrifice the merits of these patents as it provides a 
chance to argue on rebuttal that the alleged patent thicket is pro-
competitive.344 
D. Ex Ante Regulations 
Though having the ability to disincentivize companies from forming 
patent thickets, antitrust is an ex post regulation; meaning that intervention 
does not come into play until biosimilar manufacturers or consumers are 
purportedly harmed, or at least when the Federal Trade Commission finds 
out the establishment of a patent thicket. Moreover, attempting to solve the 
patent thicket problem with more litigation may lock up biosimilar 
manufacturers in lengthy legal battles and ultimately delay biosimilar 
market entry. It would be more desirable if patent thickets were not allowed 
to form or to have such a significant effect in the first place. This Section 
presents two proposals that would help in achieving this ideal. 
Sub-Section 1 proposes a small tweak the USPTO can implement to 
alleviate the effects of Type II Patent Thickets without compromising the 
incentive of incremental improvement disclosure obvious-type double 
patenting can provide. Sub-Section 2 proposes a more transformative 
reform that targets Type I and Type II Patent Thickets collectively. Named 
as the “All-in-One” approach, the reform aims to consolidate all patents 
and exclusivities into a single, more flexible, and perhaps a longer 
exclusivity period. This reform would thus streamline the system and make 
the exclusivity periods more predictable. While additional details warrant 
discussion, this proposal may nevertheless serve as a reference for further 
research. 
 
342. See id. at § 27(a)(11)(B). 
343. See Affordable Prescriptions for Patients Act § 27(a)(11)(A)(i)(II). 
344. Affordable Prescriptions for Patients Act § 27(b)(1)(B). 
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1. Targeting Type II Patent Thickets: the election of patents 
Terminal disclaimers have not comprehensively covered the problem 
that obviousness-type double patenting provides patents multiple “lives.”345 
However, the courts’ reasoning to not tie the validity and enforceability of 
patents with terminal disclaimers is not without merits. By treating the 
patents unitarily would run against what is provided under 35 U.S.C. § 282: 
“[e]ach claim of a patent (whether in independent, dependent, 
or multiple dependent form) shall be presumed valid 
independently of the validity of other claims; dependent or 
multiple dependent claims shall be presumed valid even 
though dependent upon an invalid claim.”346 
Thus, to alleviate the effects of Type II Patent Thickets without 
running afoul of 35 U.S.C. § 282, this article suggests that in addition to the 
current requirements in the terminal disclaimer,347 the USPTO demands 
patent owners to disclaim that only one patent in the patent group tied with 
terminal disclaimers be enforceable against each alleged infringer 
regarding the same alleged infringing product. The selection of the patent is 
up to the patent owner. Different patents can be asserted against different 
alleged infringers; but for each alleged infringer, the number of enforceable 
patents in the patents tied with terminal disclaimers is one. If the alleged 
infringer manages to invalidate the elected patent, the patent owner would 
not have a second chance to file other patents that are tied with the same 
terminal disclaimer against the same alleged infringer. 
Doing so would solve the problems that come from Type II Patent 
Thickets without mechanistically tying the validity and enforceability of 
the patents. This proposal is in line with the purpose of allowing obvious-
type double patenting to be overcome in the first place. The system was 
initially designed to protect incremental improvements of the patented 
invention,348 rather than allowing patent owners to amass large numbers of 
patents vigorously and to assert them all aggressively. Limiting the 
enforceability of the patents to the one patent plaintiffs believe would 
 
345. The validity and enforceability are not tied by terminal disclaimers. See Ortho Pharm. Corp., 
959 F.2d at 941; Pharmacia Corp., Inc., 417 F.3d at 1373-1375). Therefore, one cannot, by invalidating 
or proving that a patent is unenforceable, indirectly invalidate or deeming another patent tied by 
terminal disclaimers to the former patent unenforceable; thus, making the patent having “multiple 
lives.” See, supra Part VI.B.1. 
346. 35 U.S.C. § 282(a); see Ortho Pharm. Corp., 959 F.2d at 942. 
347. See MILLS ET AL., supra note 187; see 37 C.F.R. § 1.321(b); USPTO, MPEP § 804.02 (9th. 
Ed. Rev. 8.2017, Jan. 2018). 
348. See In re Van Ornum, 686 F.2d 937, 948 (C.C.P.A. 1982); see P. J. Federico, Commentary 
on the New Patent Act, 75 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 161, 208 (1993); see, supra Part VI.B.2.   
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obtain the most fruitful results will not strip away this benefit. On the other 
hand, it would also effectively neutralize the negative effects of Type II 
Patent Thickets. Competitors would only need to deal with “a single 
version” of the invention instead of multiple patents claiming incremental 
improvements of the same invention. 
Moreover, the proposal can also be indirectly backed by courts as 
there is precedent where courts impose a limit on the number of patents or 
patent claims the plaintiff can assert in a litigation for simplicity.349 Though 
following the same line of reasoning, the present proposal is better than the 
district court’s discretion in that it avoids the complications of deciding the 
number of patents that the plaintiff can assert when considering patents tied 
with terminal disclaimers. 
2. Targeting Type I and Type II Patent Thickets collectively: the “All-
in-One” approach 
Admittedly, electing patents would only serve as an ex ante regulation 
for Type II Patent Thickets. Type I Patent Thickets, though justifiable in 
some aspects,350 would still exist and complicate litigations. As explained 
below, the “All-in-One” approach aims to prevent the downsides of Type I 
and Type II Patent Thickets collectively without completely sacrificing the 
merits the patents that amount to the thickets bring. The proposal does so 
by consolidating all drug patents and exclusivities into one longer, but 
transparent and flexible exclusivity period. 
Under the proposed system, the current expedited pathway would still 
exist. The main difference is how the exclusivity periods are granted. Upon 
filing a New Drug Application of Biologics License Application, applicants 
would be required to disclaim that once the applied drug is approved, 
patents covering the drugs would all be unenforceable against future aNDA 
(abbreviated New Drug Application) or aBLA (abbreviated Biologic 
License Application) applicants—similar to terminal disclaimers. This 
disclaimer will force all brand drugs to go onboard the proposed system. 
Moreover, drug companies will also be required to disclose all relevant 
information regarding the drug, including the manufacture and the method 
of use of the drug—arguably to an extent similar to the disclosure in 
patents. In return, the law will guarantee a certain period of exclusivity 
 
349. In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Patent Litigation, 639 F.3d at 1303 (ruling that the 
district court did not violate the plaintiff’s due process rights in the complex litigation involving when 
the district court demanded the plaintiff to limit the number of asserted claims against the defendant). 
350. See, supra Part VII.A.2.; see supra note 298. 
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wherein such period no generics or biosimilar approvals will be granted by 
the FDA. Under this regime, companies can rest assured that they will be 
guaranteed to see a return on their investments. The length of the 
exclusivity period, however, can be adjusted according to their 
development costs. 
To incentivize improvements, the system allows drug companies to 
submit and disclose drug improvements to the FDA. If FDA finds the 
improvements warranted—similarly to the non-obvious standard in 
patents—the drug companies could be prized with an extended “bonus” 
exclusivity period. However, a maximum limit of the total exclusivity term 
must be set. On the other hand, if companies fail to properly disclose their 
inventions, the FDA, either acting on its own or with from the request of 
challengers, could penalize drug companies by deducting time from their 
exclusivity periods. Once the exclusivity period ends, generics or 
biosimilars would be able to enter the market. In cases where patents were 
later acquired after the submission of new drug or biologics license 
applications, laws can mandate that only reasonable remedies be available. 
In sum, the proposed system has the following benefits. First, all 
patents and exclusivities would be consolidated into one. This prevents the 
complexity Type I and Type II Patent Thickets would give rise to, 
including the increased monitoring costs and opaqueness of patents and 
exclusivities. Second, a guaranteed, more secured and perhaps longer but 
flexible exclusivity period would provide brand drug companies an 
insurance to receive a return on their investments; and thus incentivizing 
them to lower their drug prices.351 The flexibility of the exclusivity period 
also reflects the fact that not all drugs are created equal and would thus 
deserve different lengths of exclusivity periods.352 Fourth, by granting 
bonus exclusivity periods, improvements of the drug could be incentivized, 
thereby maintaining the benefits353 patents provide. The upper length limit 
of the exclusivity period balances the interest of generic and biosimilar 
 
351. Under the current patent system, drug companies may try to retrieve their investments as 
soon as possible by raising drug prices because they are in fear of losing their patent exclusivity; since 
patents can be challenged and invalidated. See, supra Part VI.A. However, if the exclusivity period is 
guaranteed and longer, drug companies would be less inclined to retrieve their investments in such a 
short period. Drug prices would arguably be lower. 
352. The current drug system acknowledges this fact by granting additional exclusivities periods 
to different types of drugs. For example, “[t]he first sponsor of a designated orphan drug to obtain FDA 
marketing approval for the designated rare disease or condition receives seven years of marketing 
exclusivity.” FDA at Rare Disease Day / February 28, 2011, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
https://www.fda.gov/ (last updated: Nov. 3, 2017). 
353. See, supra Part VII.A.2.; see, supra note 298. 
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manufacturers by providing them a precise timeline as to when they are 
guaranteed to enter the market. Under this regime, the bonus periods are 
not ever-extending, therefore neutralizing the possibility of evergreening. 
Fifth, the system discloses the inventions to the public. Once the 
exclusivity period ends, the public is free to use the invention. Sixth, only 
one agency—the FDA— is responsible for granting the exclusivities. The 
USPTO does not participate. This simplifies matters as exclusivity 
information such as patent information does not need to rely on the timely 
and properly listing of drug companies. Seventh, the system provides an 
adjustable penalty for those not complying. In the event of non-disclosure, 
the FDA, either acting on its own or with from the request of challengers, 
could penalize drug companies by deducting their exclusivity period. As 
opposed to all-or-none exclusivity protection, as in the current patent 
system, an adjustable penalty would balance the interests of these brand 
drug companies. 
However, it should be noted that the “All-in-One” approach may only 
be suitable for the pharmaceutical industry. This is because unlike other 
industries, drugs must undergo examination before reaching the market. 
The required examination provides the opportunity to consolidate the 
exclusivities into one. Should industries that do not have this examination 
process characteristic encounter patent thicket issues, the presented 
approach would be of limited use. 
Furthermore, the “All-in-One” approach is not without problems. It is 
a system with flexible exclusivity period lengths. This leads to the 
questions: who should have the power to decide the length of the 
exclusivity period for each type of drug and how should that agency handle 
this task. Moreover, what available remedies exist if drug companies do not 
agree with the agency’s decision? How about biosimilar or generic 
companies; do they have a say in this decision? Not to mention: what kinds 
of improvements would be qualified to receive the bonus exclusivity 
periods? How long would those bonus periods be? Additionally, what 
would happen if a company’s non-compliance with the system is found 
only after the exclusivity periods are over? Furthermore, how do we ensure 
that the companies timely and properly disclose their inventions? 
Some of these questions are not unique. For example, the question of 
“how do we ensure that the companies timely and properly disclose their 
inventions?” is not an unforeseen issue. Under the current patent system, it 
is considered inequitable conduct to deliberately deceive the USPTO 
regarding material information upon applying for a patent. If inequitable 
INTO THE WOODS: A BIOLOGIC PATENT THICKET ANALYSIS 12/24/2019  10:56 AM 
2019 Into the Woods: A Biologic Patent Thicket Analysis 179 
 
conduct is found, the patent would be held unenforceable.354 The analogous 
penalty under the proposed system could be a deduction from the 
exclusivity period. Other issues, on the other hand, are new challenges the 
proposed system presents. In order to fully implement this system, at least 
the questions discussed above warrant thorough discussion. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
This article demonstrates that among the top-selling drugs, biologics 
obtain more patents compared to small-molecule drugs and are thus 
arguably more likely to form patent thickets. With an in-depth analysis of 
the alleged patent thickets, this article argues that there are two types of 
patent thickets: (1) Type I Patent Thickets, which are amounted by patents 
that are inventive and less prone to double patenting; and (2) Type II Patent 
Thickets, which are accumulated by patents that are less inventive and 
more prone to double patenting. Though both types of patent thickets 
complicate patent litigation, stave away contenders and indirectly result in 
high drug prices, only Type I Patent Thickets have the capability to 
evergreen. 
While both small-molecules and biologics are capable of forming 
Type II Patent Thickets, only biologics are capable of forming Type I 
Patent Thickets. This is because Type I Patent Thickets are a result of the 
interplay between the unique nature of biologics and biosimilars; while 
Type II Patent Thickets are due to the utilization of terminal disclaimers. 
Even though Type I and Type II Patents are not completely without 
merits, the negative impacts of patent thickets are real. Thus, to alleviate 
these impacts without sacrificing the benefits these patents provide, this 
article discusses possible solutions to solve the problem. Antitrust 
litigations and current legislative proposals may serve as ex post 
regulations for the patent thicket problem. However, it would be more 
desirable if patent thickets are prevented in the first place. As such, two 
proposals are presented: the first being a minor tweak the USPTO can 
implement to target Type II Patent Thickets, and the second being a more 
transformative proposal that consolidates the drug patents and exclusivities 
into one. 
The patent thicket is a complicated issue with the interests of multiple 
stakeholders involved. Before reaching a definite conclusion on how to 
solve this problem, more discussions and debates are warranted. This 
 
354. See generally, MILLS ET AL., supra note 187, § 15:50. 
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article sheds some light on this heated topic in the hopes of contributing to 
these discussions and serving as a reference for future legal reforms or 
adjustments. 
